

*Bundery**The Department of State*

bulletin

Vol. XXIV, No. 618

May 7, 1951

**RELEASE OF ROBERT A. VOGELER BY THE
HUNGARIAN GOVERNMENT 723**

**PEACE WITHOUT FEAR • by Ambassador John Foster
Dulles 726**

**OUTLOOK AND TASKS AHEAD FOR GERMANY:
OUTLINE OF UNITED STATES POLICIES • by
John J. McCloy, U.S. High Commissioner 736**

**THE PHONY "PEACE" OFFENSIVE • by Assistant
Secretary Hickerson 731**



For index see back cover



The Department of State bulletin

VOL. XXIV, No. 618 • PUBLICATION 4211

May 7, 1951

The Department of State BULLETIN, a weekly publication compiled and edited in the Division of Publications, Office of Public Affairs, provides the public and interested agencies of the Government with information on developments in the field of foreign relations and on the work of the Department of State and the Foreign Service. The BULLETIN includes press releases on foreign policy issued by the White House and the Department, and statements and addresses made by the President and by the Secretary of State and other officers of the Department, as well as special articles on various phases of international affairs and the functions of the Department. Information is included concerning treaties and international agreements to which the United States is or may become a party and treaties of general international interest.

Publications of the Department, as well as legislative material in the field of international relations, are listed currently.

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents
U.S. Government Printing Office
Washington 25, D.C.

PRICE:
52 issues, domestic \$7.50, foreign \$10.25
Single copy, 20 cents

The printing of this publication has been approved by the Director of the Bureau of the Budget (July 29, 1949).

Note: Contents of this publication are not copyrighted and items contained herein may be reprinted. Citation of the DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN as the source will be appreciated.

Release of Robert A. Vogeler by the Hungarian Government

ASSURANCES GIVEN HUNGARY BY U.S.

[Released to the press April 28]

Robert A. Vogeler, an American citizen who has been held in Hungary for over 17 months, was today released by the Hungarian authorities and has arrived at the American Legation in Vienna. Mr. Vogeler was delivered by Hungarian officials into the custody of a representative of the American Legation in Vienna at Nickelsdorf on the Austrian frontier at 11 a.m. today (5 a.m. e.s.t.) and was escorted directly to Vienna.

The Department is gratified that this American citizen has regained the freedom of which he was unjustly deprived and that he is now safely re-united with his family. The release of Mr. Vogeler follows upon continuous efforts by the United States Government in his behalf since the beginning of his detention and brings to a successful close negotiations which the American Minister in Budapest, Nathaniel P. Davis, has carried on personally with the Hungarian Government over a long period of time, with skill and determination, under most trying conditions.

In connection with the understanding reached with the Hungarian Government for freeing Mr. Vogeler, assurances on the following points have been communicated by Mr. Davis to the Hungarian Government, and, in consequence of the latter's action in releasing Mr. Vogeler and of his safe arrival at the American Legation in Vienna, these assurances now enter into effect:

(1) The United States Government will approve the reopening of Hungarian consular establishments in New York City and Cleveland, Ohio.

(2) It will also, through its appropriate agencies, again validate the passports of private American citizens who may wish to travel to Hungary.

(3) Finally, the United States Government will facilitate the delivery of all Hungarian goods in the United States zone of Germany which, in the light of the provisions of article 30 of the treaty of peace with Hungary, have been found available for restitution, including Hungarian cultural property, and will permit two Hungarian representatives to enter the United States zone of Germany for the purpose of receiving such property and arranging for its transportation. United States civil and military officials in Ger-

many will facilitate the entry of the Hungarian representatives for the purpose stated, render them all proper assistance as regards the collection and shipment of the property in question, and regard them as official representatives of the Hungarian Government.

With regard to the matters dealt with under points (1) and (2) above, it is, of course, the expectation of this Government that the Hungarian Government's observance of consular rights and the rights of American citizens will be in accord with international law and practice and with the provisions of existing treaties between the United States and Hungary. Moreover, private American citizens who may wish to travel to Hungary will undoubtedly wish to inform themselves through the Department or American missions abroad concerning conditions in that country.

BACKGROUND OF NEGOTIATIONS IN VOGELER CASE

[Released to the press April 28]

Mr. Vogeler was arrested on November 18, 1949, by the Hungarian security police and was not permitted to communicate with his family or to have access to American consular officials at any time or in any manner. As may be recalled from documents released by the Department at the time, the conduct of the Hungarian Government was such that the United States Government was impelled to close the Hungarian consulates in New York City and in Cleveland, Ohio, and to prohibit further travel by private American citizens to Hungary. Mr. Vogeler was brought to trial before the Criminal Court in Budapest on February 17, 1950, on an indictment charging espionage and sabotage, and was sentenced by that Court on February 21, to 15 years in prison. The decision of the Hungarian Supreme Court upholding this sentence was announced in the Hungarian press on May 11.

The United States Government, deeply concerned at the arbitrary arrest of Mr. Vogeler, his prolonged detention without access at any time to American consular representatives, and the ex-

parte nature of the entire trial proceedings, made repeated protests and representations through its diplomatic representative, Mr. Davis, against the conduct of the Hungarian Government, which was in flagrant violation of elemental human rights and all accepted standards of justice.¹ It also affirmed in the clearest terms that it regarded the allegations made by the Hungarian authorities against Mr. Vogeler as palpably false and politically motivated. This conclusion has been confirmed in every detail by the Department's study of the Hungarian Government's published account of the proceedings against Mr. Vogeler.

On March 25, 1950, Mr. Davis called in person on Deputy Prime Minister Matyas Rakosi in order to press representations in behalf of Mr. Vogeler before the highest Hungarian authority. On this occasion, for the first time, it was indicated that the Hungarian Government might be disposed to give serious consideration to the request of this Government that Mr. Vogeler be released and permitted to depart from Hungary. The essential position of the United States Government on which Mr. Davis was instructed to base his approach was then, as throughout subsequent negotiations, that this Government stood ready, upon the release of Mr. Vogeler by the Hungarian Government, to rescind those measures which it had put into effect because of the Hungarian Government's unwarranted proceedings against Mr. Vogeler. Mr. Davis was also authorized to inform the Hungarian Government that a satisfactory solution of the Vogeler case would make it possible for the United States Government, pursuant to the provisions of article 30 of the treaty of peace with Hungary, to facilitate the delivery of Hungarian goods in the United States zone of Germany which had been found available for restitution to Hungary. The delivery of such goods to Hungary had been suspended since 1948 because of various differences between the United States and Hungarian Governments.

The conversations thus begun were patiently pursued by Mr. Davis with the Hungarian Foreign Office and were brought to an apparently satisfactory conclusion on June 16, 1950, when the Hungarian authorities agreed to proceed promptly with arrangements for Mr. Vogeler's deportation. According to this understanding, it was agreed that this Government, upon the release of Mr. Vogeler and his safe arrival at the American Legation in Vienna, would (1) permit the reopening of Hungarian consular establishments in New York City and in Cleveland, Ohio, (2) again validate the passports of private United States citizens who might wish to travel to Hungary, and (3) facilitate the delivery of all Hungarian goods in the United States zone of Germany which had

been found available for restitution to that country. The Minister was informed by the Hungarian Foreign Office that he would be notified on June 19 of the exact time and arrangements for Mr. Vogeler's release. Unfortunately, the attitude of the Hungarian Government in this matter underwent a sudden and complete change between June 16 and June 20, and, by the latter date, the Hungarian authorities were no longer prepared to carry out the "full agreement" of June 16 for Mr. Vogeler's release.

On June 17 and 18, the terms agreed upon for Mr. Vogeler's release received premature publicity, and this occasioned wide speculation in the press. Subsequently, moreover, in the latter part of June, a rumor of unknown origin was given wide circulation by the press to the effect that the principal condition for Mr. Vogeler's release was the return of the historic Crown of St. Stephen of Hungary. This report was entirely untrue, as the subject of the Crown up to that time had never arisen in connection with the Vogeler negotiations. Mr. Davis and the Department, being concerned to forestall a complete breakdown of diplomatic negotiations which it was imperative to carry out on a confidential basis and being desirous of preserving the framework of agreement laboriously established after many months, concluded in this situation that the interests of Mr. Vogeler would be seriously prejudiced by any public discussion or comment on their part regarding the details of the case. They, therefore, remained largely silent, although the Department felt it necessary to affirm in response to public inquiries that this Government was continuing its efforts to effect Mr. Vogeler's release and to caution that the speculative reports then current with regard to the subject should be treated with the greatest reserve.

When Mr. Davis called at the Hungarian Foreign Office on June 20, 1950, the Under Secretary for Foreign Affairs, Dr. Andor Berei, made it clear that the Hungarian authorities regarded the premature publicity on the terms of the agreement as particularly aggravating. Dr. Berei then insisted that the question of interference with the broadcasts of Radio Petofi in Budapest, allegedly resulting from Voice of America Hungarian-language broadcasts transmitted from Munich, had not been properly clarified by previous discussion and that, accordingly, a solution of this problem was an essential condition for Mr. Vogeler's release. This was an entirely new condition for, although the matter had previously been discussed by Mr. Davis with the Hungarian Foreign Office in connection with the Vogeler negotiations, it had originally been treated as a technical matter requiring clarification rather than as a condition which the United States Government would be required to meet before Mr. Vogeler's release. Mr. Davis had presented and the Hungarian Foreign Office had accepted such a clarification,

¹ For materials previously released, see BULLETIN of Jan. 2, 1950, p. 21; Jan. 16, 1950, p. 95; Feb. 27, 1950, p. 323; Mar. 6, 1950, pp. 377 and 378; Mar. 13, 1950, pp. 398 and 399.

wherein it was pointed out that the alleged interference could be eliminated or alleviated if the Hungarian radio held exactly to its prescribed wave length and avoided spreading its signal.

Despite the Hungarian refusal on June 20 to implement the agreement reached on June 16, Mr. Davis remained in touch with the Hungarian Foreign Office in the hope of resolving the new differences which had arisen. However, the situation did not improve, for on September 11, 1950, Minister Davis was informed by the Hungarian Foreign Office that it would require as a further condition for Mr. Vogeler's release the return to Hungary of St. Stephen's Crown. Thus, this matter, which had become the subject of unfounded reports and speculation after mid-June, now entered into and complicated the subsequent negotiations for Mr. Vogeler's release.

The Hungarian demands with respect to St. Stephen's Crown and the elimination of radio interference proved to be serious obstacles to the early conclusion of a new agreement for Mr. Vogeler's release and, as new factors, necessitated a review of the entire situation.

Mr. Davis, with the approval of the Department, continued his conversations with the Hungarian Foreign Office with a view to exploring all possibilities for bringing about Mr. Vogeler's release. In addition to his constant efforts looking toward the accomplishment of this fundamental objective, the Minister also approached the Foreign Office on December 12, 1950, in a renewed attempt to secure permission on humanitarian as well as legal grounds for an American consular representative to visit and talk with Mr. Vogeler at regular intervals at his place of detention or elsewhere for the purpose of ascertaining his welfare, needs, and treatment. However, this request was rejected by the Hungarian Foreign Office on December 16, 1950, on the grounds that it lacked all legal foundation and that "under present circumstances the Hungarian authorities are unable to meet such requests."

Meanwhile, it had become increasingly evident that because of the proximity of the frequency used by Radio Petofi in Budapest and the failure of that station to stabilize its transmitter precisely on that frequency, the VOA Hungarian-language broadcasts transmitted from Munich were frequently rendered unintelligible to listeners in Hungary, particularly in the Budapest area. When further investigation confirmed this fact, the Department concluded that it would be in the interest of effective VOA broadcasting to utilize another frequency which would assure a clear channel. Accordingly, this Government on its own initiative decided to terminate the relay of the VOA Hungarian program through Munich and to utilize another channel which would enable clear broadcasting. This change was announced by the VOA to Hungarian listeners on April 1 and was effected on April 7.

On April 9, 1951, following his return to Budapest from Washington on consultation, Mr. Davis called at the Hungarian Foreign Office to renew official discussions with Dr. Berei and to present the position of the United States Government once more in concrete terms. The Minister referred to the action which the United States Government, being concerned no less than the Hungarian Government with the problem of radio interference, had already taken on its own initiative and in its own interest to terminate the relay of the VOA Hungarian-language program through Munich and to transmit through another channel clear of such interference. The Minister added that he assumed this action effectively disposed of the question of radio interference raised by the Hungarian Government. With regard to the question of St. Stephen's Crown, Mr. Davis informed Dr. Berei as follows:

The Government of the United States is not prepared to discuss the return of St. Stephen's Crown as a condition to the release of Mr. Robert A. Vogeler. This property was not removed by force from Hungary but was surrendered to United States authorities for safe-keeping and is being held in trust by them. It is therefore outside the scope of restitution and continues to be treated as property of a special status. The Government of the United States does not regard the present juncture as opportune or otherwise appropriate for taking any action regarding its disposition.

In conclusion, Mr. Davis stated to Dr. Berei, with reference to the part of the agreement of June 16, 1950, dealing with restitution, that the United States Government would perforce have to proceed with the liquidation by public sale of Hungarian property in the United States zone of Germany found available for restitution, other than Hungarian cultural property, if full agreement were not reached by April 30 for Mr. Vogeler's release and the way thus cleared for the return of such property to Hungary.

Dr. Berei received the Minister's presentation of the United States position on these matters without substantive comment and stated that he would report to his Government at once and communicate its reply to the Minister as soon as possible. On April 20, Dr. Berei made known to Mr. Davis, orally and in writing, that the Hungarian Government did not accept the United States viewpoint concerning the status of St. Stephen's Crown. He added, however, that independently of this question his Government perceived no obstacle to the release of Mr. Vogeler at an early date, in view of the disposal of the question of radio interference, provided that the points of the agreement of June 16, 1950, regarding the Hungarian consulates, travel of United States citizens to Hungary, and restitution were confirmed by the Minister in writing. A press release issued by the Hungarian Foreign Office on April 21 officially confirmed that the negotiations for Mr. Vogeler's release had been concluded successfully.

Peace Without Fear

*by Ambassador John Foster Dulles
Consultant to the Secretary¹*

The United States, in association with its allies and in consultation with Japan, is seeking a prompt peace, a just peace, a peace insured by collective power.

These three principles have solid bipartisan support in the United States. If that were not so, our mission would not be here today. The change in the Supreme Command has left United States policies untouched insofar as relates to Japan. That is good news, for policies which depend upon the vicissitudes of individual fortunes are always fragile. Policies which surmount personalities are the policies which are dependable. All the world can now know that our Japanese policies have that quality of dependability and of survival.

Prompt Peace

The fact that the United States is seeking a prompt peace is shown by the energy with which our Government has been moving forward. Our mission was established by the President on January 10, 1951. We left for Japan on January 22, 1951. After nearly 2 weeks of intensive activity here, we went on to the Philippines, Australia, and New Zealand. We laid the foundation for an Australian-New Zealand-United States security arrangement related to the Japanese peace. My deputy, Mr. Allison, went to England. We completed the task of drafting, as a working paper, the complete text of a suggested Japanese peace treaty. We circulated that text to the 15 other Governments principally concerned, and we have given personal explanations to 14 of them.

In all of these matters, we have maintained close working relations with our Congress.

We availed of the presence in Washington of the Foreign Ministers of the 20 other American

states, all belligerents, to explain to them the principles of the Japanese peace we sought.

Within a few hours following the retirement of General MacArthur as Supreme Commander and after confirming that there was continuing bipartisan support of established policies, we returned to Japan so that the new Supreme Commander, General Ridgway, might be fully informed. He has been informed, and, already his great ability, tested not only in war but also in the counsels of the United Nations, is being dedicated to the attainment of peace.

We have taken advantage of our presence here to inform your Prime Minister and other Japanese political leaders of the progress made, of the obstacles surmounted, and the problems that remain.

The records of the past 3 months admit of no doubt as to our intention to seek an early peace. It is not necessary, in this respect, to rely upon what we say. You can see what we do.

Just Peace

The peace we seek is a just peace which will promote reconciliation between those who have been enemies. When I spoke in Tokyo last February, we talked of a peace of trust and of opportunity.² The treaty terms, which we have now tentatively formulated, were described in an address made in Los Angeles on March 31.³ I shall not describe them here again because they are familiar to you. I am confident you have found that our detailed proposals fully conform to what we forecast here. The peace treaty we envisage would, in fact, restore Japan as a free and equal member of the society of nations.

There is always the temptation to take advantage of a defeated nation's helplessness to impose restrictions of a kind which are not applicable to

¹ Address made before a meeting of the United Nations Association of Japan, at the Industrial Club, Tokyo, on Apr. 23 and released to the press on the same date.

² BULLETIN of Feb. 12, 1951, p. 252.
³ BULLETIN of Apr. 9, 1951, p. 576.

other sovereign nations. The United States is opposed to that. We are convinced that the welfare of all concerned, the victors as well as the vanquished, will best be served by a peace which will erase the wounds of war, not keep them festering.

General MacArthur, who largely inspired our concept of peace, said that it "brings a new spiritual idea to mankind and evokes a new standard of morality in international relations." That is worth doing. Though the value of that is intangible, it is not, on that account, less real.

Secure Peace

We seek a peace that will be insured by the deterrent of collective power. When I last spoke there on February 2, I referred to the United Nations concept that there should be "effective collective measures for the prevention of threats to the peace." Veto power in the Security Council has prevented the United Nations itself from setting up an effective security force. But the United Nations principle is, nevertheless, being applied through regional collective security arrangements, which are contemplated by the Charter. In that way, there is being built up collective power to deter aggression.

Today, the material might to deter aggression resides largely in the United States. But, as we said here before, the United States is prepared to combine its power with that of others in mutual committals so that the deterrent power that protects us will also protect others. Japan can, if it wishes, share in that protection.

The Obstacle of Fear

Since we have been here, many have asked us about the obstacles that lie in the way of the prompt, just, and secure peace we seek. Of course, there are obstacles. That is a normal incident of every great achievement. There are, however, no obstacles that seem to be insurmountable except perhaps the obstacle of fear. Fear is a paralyzing, a corroding emotion. It destroys men's capacity to think clearly, and it makes them irresolute in action. Fear is a negative rather than a positive force. The most important task, to clear the way for the peace we seek, is to dispel the fears that harass us.

United States Stands Firm in the Pacific

Some seem to fear that the offer of the United States to establish collective security for Japan and for other Pacific areas means little because, they suggest, the power we possess will only be used to protect the members of the North Atlantic pact, leaving Asia in a position of neglect. That suggestion is wholly without foundation. I do not ask you to believe that merely because I say it. I

ask you to consider such indisputable facts as the following:

1. Of the Armed Forces of the United States which are outside of our homeland, a large part are in Asia.

2. The Far Eastern Air Force has been expanded in numbers and facilities, a fresh United States Army division has, in the last few days, arrived in Japan to strengthen the position here, while still another is en route.

3. The United States stands ready, by bilateral arrangement with Japan, to continue after the peace a screen of protection which could not be breached without placing upon the United States grave responsibilities, which we publicly accept.

4. The United States has, and expects to maintain, armed force at Okinawa, and new construction there is steadily going forward.

5. The United States has in the Philippines military-operating rights and facilities pursuant to agreement with that Government, and President Truman, only last week, has affirmed that an armed attack on the Philippines would be looked upon by the United States as dangerous to its own peace and safety and that it would act accordingly.

6. The United States, as the President further announced last week, is prepared, in connection with reestablishment of peace with Japan, to make an arrangement with Australia and New Zealand providing for common action to meet the common danger inherent in an armed attack upon any of them in the Pacific.

7. The bulk of United States power, and notably its strategic air power, remains, of course, within the United States itself. But, there, it also serves others. An armed attack upon any of the areas, East or West, where there are such arrangements as I have described, could bring into play this immense retaliatory striking power. That is known, and that knowledge exerts a powerful influence for peace. The Japanese nation can share the security which the United States itself and others derive from the fact that potential aggressors know that they cannot attack without subjecting themselves to the risk of great disaster.

8. Secretary Acheson, speaking in Washington on April 18, in discussing the contemplated arrangements between the United States and Japan for the continued security of Japan said that Japan's safety is of vital concern to us both.⁴

In the light of all these facts, it is ridiculous to pretend that the collective security which is offered to Japan is illusory.

Fear of Indirect Aggression

Let us turn now to a second cause of fear, the fear that the Soviet Union and the Soviet Com-

⁴ BULLETIN of Apr. 30, 1951, p. 683.

unist Party (Bolshevik) may not leave Japan alone.

As I pointed out in speaking here last February, international danger has two aspects. There is the danger of direct aggression and also of indirect aggression.

I cannot in honesty say to you that the menace of indirect aggression is illusory. That is a danger that is ever present and all pervading. In every free country of the world, there exists, partly in the open but also invariably underground, a Bolshevik organization working to gain political control so as to add that country to the list of those which are subject to the will of international communism. Their avowed goal is to achieve a universal state under the domination of the Soviet Communist Party as the leader of the world proletariat. In their efforts, they accept the direction of the Moscow Politburo as being what they call the General Staff of the world proletariat. This is a danger which, as I say, exists everywhere. It is, however, a danger which, when it is recognized, can be met. That has been proved time after time.

Communism wins its internal victories by using fraud and terrorism to win converts and by then using these converts first to break down orderly government and then to seize power through revolutionary effort. Those methods fail utterly when falsehood is met with truth; when secrecy is confronted with exposure; and, above all, when the society is so sound and healthy that there are not mass discontents which furnish communism with recruits. Confronted by these conditions, the tactics of Bolshevik communism cannot prevail.

The consequences of Communist conquest are now so demonstrably evil that to abet the conquest is a supreme crime. We see these consequences in China and North Korea. There the Communist rulers, like all true Communists of the Bolshevik school, proclaim and protest loyalty to the Politburo at Moscow, and now the destitute and war-weary peoples of North Korea and China are being fed into the fiery furnace of a war of aggression to gain control of all Korea, an area which has been a strategic objective of Russia since the days of the czars. The total casualties of North Korean and Communist Chinese forces in Korea between June 25, 1950 and April 17, 1951, are officially estimated by the United Nations Command as being 827,186. This awful sacrifice is so sickening that all peoples in their senses will take the necessary measures so that they will not, in turn, become victims of Communist despotism and be made to pour out the lives of their youth to promote the fanatical Bolshevik dream of world domination.

The danger is real. It is a danger that confronts every nation in the world, but it is a danger that can be dealt with and which will be dealt with by all who see the danger, for the consequences of neglect are disastrous.

The Danger of Direct Aggression

There is, of course, some risk of general war, but I personally doubt that the rulers of Russia now want it. I may be wrong. No one can be certain of what goes on within the dark recesses of the Kremlin. But experience to date indicates that the rulers of Soviet Russia spread fear of general war primarily because that helps the Communist Parties in non-Communist countries to strengthen their position so that they can take over from within.

I recall that in 1948, the Prime Minister of France told me that the Communist Party within France had been greatly strengthened numerically by rumors that France would be invaded by the Red armies of Russia. The Communists deliberately spread those rumors and sought to capitalize on the resultant fear by urging membership in the Party as a means of getting safety as against liquidation when the Red armies moved in.

That is standard technique, and I should be surprised if it is not practiced in all other countries within reach of the military power of Russia.

Also, I recall the furor that Soviet Russia raised when the North Atlantic security pact was made 2 years ago. The Russian leaders cried to high heaven that this security arrangement constituted in fact an offensive threat and that it involved the United Kingdom and France in violation of their treaties of alliance with Russia. Communists indicated that this might be a cause for war.

Some timid souls were paralyzed with fright and saw, in nightmares, the Red army marching into Western Europe. Those who were calmer and more experienced saw that the Red armies would not march on the basis of some legalistic pretext. They saw that it was better to gain strength than to succumb to blackmail which would mean permanent weakness and the living in perpetual fear. So the Atlantic countries went ahead. They made their security pact, they began to implement it, and the Red armies did not march.

There is always danger of war when there are ambitious despots who control a great military establishment. That has been so since the beginning of time. However, the evidence to date suggests that the present program for world conquest is primarily the program of the Communist Party, that it is being pursued primarily by methods of indirect aggression, and that the fear of direct aggression and armed attack is being spread to frighten the free peoples into a condition which will make them vulnerable to conquest from within.

Over-All Peace

Those who seek alternatives to collective security are the victims of a great illusion.

Some seek safety in what they call an over-all peace. That means, I take it, that they do not

want peace before it is offered jointly by the free nations and also by Soviet Russia.

It is, of course, highly desirable that the Soviet Union should become a party to the kind of peace we seek for Japan. The United States has sought earnestly to bring that about, and we shall continue to do so. We have been scrupulous to seek to keep in touch with the representatives of the Soviet Union precisely as with the other Allies principally concerned.

For some months, the Soviet Government, through Jacob Malik, carried on discussions with us. Before coming to Japan last January, I explained to Mr. Malik the exploratory nature of our mission; that no final decisions would be taken and that we would discuss the situation with him when we returned. In accordance with that promise, immediately upon our return, we sought to see him to report the good prospects ahead, and to exchange views about future procedure. Thereupon, Mr. Malik, presumably under instructions, announced to the press that he would not "resume negotiation on a Japanese peace treaty."

We were not willing to reply on a press announcement on so important a matter. Therefore, we personally approached Mr. Malik to find out whether the press statement must be accepted at its face value. He confirmed that his Government was unwilling to resume our Japanese peace treaty discussions.

Even so, however, we do not accept the rebuff as final. We have submitted our suggested text of treaty to the Soviet Embassy in Washington and, in this way, informed the Soviet Government that the United States would appreciate its consideration of the draft and an early expression of its views. We have further informed the Soviet Government that thereafter the Government of the United States would expect again to get in touch with the Soviet Government with a view to concerting future procedures.

Our approach has so far elicited no response, and it may be that the Soviet Union intends to disassociate itself from the Japanese peace. If so, the reasons will not be hard to find. The Soviet Government talks much of peace but in fact, when peace comes near, they avoid it like the plague. They do so because they desire to deny the reassurance which peace would bring and to keep alive the fear upon which the Bolshevik Communist Party capitalizes in its efforts at indirect aggression.

If that attitude persists, then those who advocate a so-called over-all peace are, in effect, advocating no peace at all.

Neutrality and Friendship

There are some who feel that neutrality is safer than collective security. Neutrality would, of course, be normal if we were living in a world where aggression was permanently banished. But in a world where there are still aggressors, neutrality

is no protection, rather it encourages aggression.

No one has spoken more clearly or eloquently on this point than Stalin himself. Speaking on March 10, 1939, Stalin bitterly reproached what he called "the non-aggressive states, primarily England, France, and the United States" because, he said they—

. . . have rejected the policy of collective security, the policy of collective resistance to the aggressors, and have taken up a position of nonintervention, a position of "neutrality." That policy might be defined as follows: "Let each country defend itself from the aggressors as it likes and as best it can" . . . but, actually speaking the policy of nonintervention means conniving at aggression.

We should all be advised to remember these words. History is full of examples of how illusory it is to seek security through neutrality and pacts of nonaggression and of friendship.

Let us recall the experience of the National Government of China.

As part of the Yalta arrangement of February, 1945, Stalin agreed to conclude with the National Government of China a pact of friendship and alliance. Six months later, the Soviet Union did in fact make such a pact. The National Government of China, in accordance with the Yalta proposal, agreed to surrender to Russia effective control of Manchurian railroads, Port Arthur, and Dairen. But in return, as was stipulated by the Yalta proposal, the Soviet Union made with the National Government of China a treaty of friendship and alliance and solemnly promised that, for 20 years, it would—

. . . render to China moral support and aid in military supplies and other material resources, such support and aid to be entirely given to the National Government as the central government of China.

A few days later, the Japanese surrender having been concluded, the Russians moved into Manchuria, Port Arthur, Dairen, North Korea, South Sakhalin, and the Kuril and Habomai Islands, thus cashing in on a formal belligerency that had lasted 6 days. In Manchuria, they acquired not only Japanese industrial investments but also vast amounts of Japanese armament and ammunition dumps. These latter they turned over to the Chinese Red armies, despite the explicit agreement they had just made, to give military supplies only to the National Government.

In October 1949, in another direct violation of its 20-year treaty of 1945, the Soviet Government withdrew its recognition of the National Government and recognized the Red regime of Mao Tse-tung as the government of all China.

The lessons are clear. As Stalin said, the only reliable security policy is the policy of collective resistance to aggressors and a policy of neutrality means in fact "conniving at aggression."

The Road to Peace

I have spoken of fears in the hope of allaying fear. Fear itself is usually far more dangerous

than what is feared, for it destroys the capacity to surmount danger.

As we have seen, the actual danger that confronts us, the danger of indirect aggression, can be dealt with. The danger of direct aggression is a kind of danger that has been constant in the world as it has existed for thousands of years. There is today much more chance to overcome that type of danger than ever before in the history of mankind. Now, for the first time, there is a possibility of collective measures adequate to assure that victims will not be plucked one by one. Therefore, we can face the future with courage and confidence and act to seek the kind of peace that the nations envisaged when they met at San Francisco and drafted the United Nations Charter which should always be our guide.

Collective Security

That Charter, you will recall, rejects the thesis of pacifism that there should be no armament and no resistance to aggression. On the contrary, the Charter imposes upon every member the obligation to stand ready to provide armed forces for the maintenance of international peace and security. The Charter recognizes that there is a right of individual and collective self-defense and that this is what it calls an inherent right. It recognizes the need for "effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace." It contemplates regional arrangements as an agency for peace.

It is in pursuance of those principles that the President of the United States last week outlined his plans for strengthening the fabric of peace in the Pacific Ocean area by a series of steps which initially would include (a) a posttreaty security arrangement between the United States and Japan; (b) the maintenance of armed forces at Okinawa; (c) recognition that an armed attack on the Philippines would be looked upon by the United States as dangerous to its own peace and safety; and (d) the conclusion with the Governments of Australia and New Zealand of an arrangement whereby, in the event of an armed attack upon any of them in the Pacific, each of the three would act to meet the common danger. These measures, he pointed out, were "initial steps," and, as Secretary Acheson pointed out the following day, they will not interfere in any way with such broader arrangements as nations in the Pacific area may wish to develop—arrangements which he said would receive the sympathetic interest of the United States.

The series of measures thus outlined, taken in the aggregate, represent major steps in the exercise of regional and collective security rights which are authorized by the United Nations Charter, and which all of the members of the United Nations have by the Charter recognized to be in the interest of peace, security, and justice. Let us

also recall that the United Nations Charter, while it recognizes the necessity of there being armed force to resist armed attack, lays down another principle; namely, the principle that "force shall not be used, save in the common interest." This great principle, if given practical expression in arrangements for collective security, automatically gives hope that armed force created for security will not serve to create insecurity. Since this principle is embodied in practice, it will mean that individual nations will be less inclined and less able to use national force to promote purely national ambitions. It is a principle which operates against the militarism which neither Japan nor its neighbors want.

Economic Well-Being

Let us also recall article 55 of the Charter of the United Nations, which recognizes that stability and well-being are necessary for peaceful and friendly relations among nations and which calls upon the nations to promote higher standards of living, full employment, and conditions of economic and social progress and development.

The leaders and people of Japan are, I know, concerned with their economic problems, and that is a natural concern. It is because of the difficulty of the Japanese economic position that the United States stands against imposing such economic burdens and disabilities as would make it improbable that Japan would realize the conditions which the Charter of the United Nations recognizes to be necessary for lasting peace.

If the Japanese conform in public and private trade and commerce to internationally accepted fair practices and if the industry, the aptitude, and the ingenuity of the Japanese people are devoted to developing mutually desirable trade and commerce with the rest of the world, that should assure the possibility of a rising economic standard.

In this connection, it is useful to recall that trade and commerce are apt to flourish where they have the protection of a common security system. If there is concluded between Japan and the United States such a post-treaty security arrangement as the President of the United States has suggested, that in itself will promote the confidence which will encourage business and finance within our two nations to work together in cooperation for mutual advantage.

Human Rights

Let us also recall that the United Nations Charter calls for universal respect for and observance of human rights and fundamental freedoms and for cultural and educational cooperation.

In Japan, human freedom and opportunity have already been vastly enlarged during the occupation through such measures as women's suffrage,

land reform, the organization of labor, the liquidation of militarism and police terrorism, freedom of the press, and, broadly, the giving of sovereignty to the people through a truly representative government. Japan is today one of the nations which are in the forefront of those seeking to conform their conduct to the high ideals enunciated in the United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

You are eager for cultural and educational cooperation and, in this respect, you have much to give, for your people have demonstrated over the centuries the capacity to appreciate and create beauty and culture.

The free world, in turn, welcomes cooperation

with Japan in the field of education and culture, and our mission is perhaps unique in the history of peace missions in that one of its members was specifically charged with finding ways to promote cultural and educational cooperation.

Conclusion

We stand at a threshold beyond which lies a vista of opportunities that are immense and glorious. The door is not yet open, but we hold in our hands the key. Let not our hand be paralyzed by fears and doubts. Let us dare to use that key to open that door and go forward on the road to peace.

The Phony "Peace" Offensive

by John D. Hickerson

Assistant Secretary for United Nations Affairs¹

How well do we in the United States understand Soviet techniques designed to undermine the free world?

In the great debates taking place in this country about how we can best defend ourselves from the threat of Soviet imperialism, we should not lose sight of the aims and methods utilized by those who would destroy us.

Some Soviet techniques we now understand fairly well—such as subversion through coups, espionage, overt aggression through satellites, and the constant repetition of blatantly false propaganda. But are we sufficiently alert to some of the more subtle maneuverings of the Kremlin which are designed to advance Soviet imperialism by exploiting the free world's sincere desire for peace? I doubt it.

I would like, therefore, to talk to you today about one of the most insidious weapons of the Cominform—the phony "peace" offensive.

We are in a period of history which is unique in many ways. Man's aspiration to live in harmony with his fellow man has existed since the beginning of time. But, there has probably never been a time when more people, from all walks of life, in all parts of the world, were so anxious for peace. The last two world wars reached into the homes of millions of people, took away dear ones and wrecked the products of their life's work. At no time have the ravages of war been felt by so many. A new war would affect more rather

than fewer men, and its potential havoc is terrifying to contemplate. Paradoxically, however, there have been few times in history when a just peace has been so hard to attain.

The universal desire for peace is not lost on the men in the Kremlin. Although they alone are sabotaging peace, they see in this universal desire for peace an opportunity to exploit for their own ends.

Exploiting the Desire for Peace

Why has the Kremlin found it desirable to exploit this yearning for peace?

The Soviet's ability to extend their power through the medium of communism, as an economic and political belief, has been steadily losing ground in most parts of the world. The Cominform brand of "domestic" communism has become known for what it is—an arm of Soviet expansionism, entirely subservient to the aims of the Kremlin.

Communism thrives on empty stomachs, on chaos, and on fear. As the free nations of the world increase their security, the appeal of communism declines.

The democratic nations of the world have made tremendous strides in the reconstruction of their countries and in their ability to defend themselves. The material betterment we have achieved far outstrips the progress made by the Soviets and their satellites. The free countries are proving that they can give to the world an ever-expanding economic and social program.

¹Address made before the 2d Annual Institute on U.S. Foreign Policy at Milwaukee, Wis. on Apr. 27 and released to the press on the same date.

The Marshall Plan, Point 4, the North Atlantic Treaty, and the Rio Pact have given evidence of the ability of the democracies to provide bread and security.

The Communists must realize that no informed person believes them when they claim to be the champions of social justice. Thus, the area, in which the Soviet Union can persuade people without the use of force, has been steadily decreasing. Theirs is a bankrupt philosophy, and, more and more, people have come to realize this. As political dogma, it is as dated as the slang of another decade.

The decline in the Soviet Union's ability to sell its wares and the increasing strength of the democratic nations are matters of grave concern to Soviet leaders. To rally support, they have, therefore, seized on one central theme with which no one can quarrel. That theme is peace. Of course, we all want peace. As long as the Communists don't define it—for a Communist definition is invariably a contradiction of the term itself—the people of the world will naturally tend to support a campaign for peace.

Let us see, now, how the Kremlin has tried to exploit the peace theme. In Paris, back in 1949, the Communists set up the partisans-of-peace organization. Together with the word "peace" they utilized the word "partisan," which had strong associations among democratic peoples with the united effort during World War II to overthrow the tyranny of totalitarianism. They sought to gather strength for their campaign of deceit through use of these universally appealing words. These so-called partisans of peace later met at Stockholm where they initiated the notorious Stockholm Appeal. Later, they met in Warsaw where they established an executive body known as the World Peace Council. The first meeting of this World Peace Council was in East Berlin last February.

What is this World Peace Council?

The Council asserts grandiloquently that it has 262 members from 60 countries and represents 500 million people. It claims to be a more representative international organization than the United Nations itself. Let's investigate it more carefully. The total population of the U.S.S.R. and Communist China exceeds 500 million, and no one can tell how many of these are included among the 500 million people supposedly represented by the World Peace Council. Representatives are selected to the World Peace Council by the usual Communist methods of "self-election" or appointment.

We can well imagine how the U.S.S.R., Chinese Communists, and satellite ones are chosen. Who are some of these representatives who purport to represent other countries? Joliet-Curie, who is the chairman, is an avowed Communist who was removed last year from his position as High Commissioner of the French Atomic Energy Board,

because of doubt about his primary loyalty to France. Does he purport to speak for France? Paul Robeson is a member of the Executive Council. Does he purport to speak for 153 million Americans?

These are two representative examples of who it is that speaks for countries in this World Peace Council. The others are largely persons notorious in their own country; thoroughly discredited in the eyes of their own countrymen; and hand-picked for their naivete or primary loyalty to the Soviet Union. The net result is that at least 85 percent of the members of the World Peace Council are Communists or fellow travelers. To make insurance doubly sure, control of the Council is in the hands of its executive bureau. All but two of the 27 members of this bureau are either Communists or fellow travelers. The very structure of this organization is indicative of its origin. This is typical Communist-front organizational procedure.

In the United States, the mission of the World Peace Council is carried on by something that calls itself the American Peace Crusade. This group was publicly exposed by Secretary Acheson last February as merely a continuation of the spurious partisans-of-peace movement. The entire program of this shadowy group coincides with the foreign policy objectives of the U.S.S.R.

How does this World Peace Council operate?

The object of this organization is to obtain widespread support from groups which would not ordinarily respond to Communist doctrines. It is its aim, through playing the role of champion of "peace," to win these people away from the support of democratic ideas and policies to a concept of false neutrality. They will play upon the universal desire for peace; upon abhorrence of warfare; upon the purposes of the United Nations. They try to garner support under these general rubrics.

Let us look at the fine print, however. You will note how this support for peace is cleverly coupled with support of specific Communist objectives, and how it is hypocritically designed to exploit inconsistent local prejudices.

Here is how this specious device works. A world-wide drive for peace is started. Peace has a universal appeal. The man in the factory in Detroit wants peace; the farmer in Brittany wants peace; the man in the rice paddy of South Asia wants peace. When beamed at South Asia, the propaganda organ of the partisans is for peace and against colonialism. In exploiting Asian nationalism, they fail to say that they want to impose a totalitarian government subservient to Soviet imperialism. They want to create a power vacuum into which they can inject their fifth column and secure control over these peoples in a way which makes old time colonial rule look enlightened. No colonial domination of the old order was ever felt so heavily by the people as is the tyranny of Soviet imperialism.

When talking to the Frenchman, they are for peace and against German rearmament. By exploiting the historic fear of a militant Germany, they seek to bring about a weak Europe—a Europe they can dominate with fear and overrun when it suits their purposes. When talking to Germany, they are for peace and a strong, unified Germany. When talking to certain parts of the Far East, they want peace and are against Japanese rearmament. Playing on the fears of a resurgent Japan, they seek again a power vacuum in which the Japanese people will not be able to defend themselves. In this way, the organization couples a universal idea with a local issue with which to serve their own interests.

Soviet Agitation by "Peace" Meetings

In addition to a skillful, constant use of mass media for such purposes, they have scheduled—to use the parlance of bureaucracy—regional and functional meetings. There is, for example, a meeting sponsored by the World Peace Council in the American hemisphere scheduled for this summer. The issue of peace will doubtless be coupled with local prejudice in such a way as to be useful to the local Communist parties. Perhaps it will be peace and Yankee imperialism. Perhaps, it will be peace and the alleged exploitation of Latin America in some other form by the United States. At all these meetings, the unwary will soon find that peace means Soviet peace; that the meeting is being run by experienced Soviet-trained agitators and Communist organizers.

I mentioned earlier that the World Peace Council claims to have the support of millions for peace. But the organization will also claim that these millions support its specific policies. This is but one of the insidious methods by which they are attempting to obtain wide support for their own ends from innocent, well-meaning peoples. A well-meaning person may sign a petition saying simply: "I am for a peace pact." Whether he knows it or not, his name is misused as a supporter of Soviet imperialism. Like the not yet forgotten American practice of offering free lunch with a nickel glass of beer, the World Peace Council is trying to sell its product—Soviet imperialism—by promising world peace.

The obvious attempt is to create a propaganda basis which could be used to divide the free world. Their aim is to drive a wedge between the people and their governments, and between free governments themselves. To this end, they utilize innocent non-Communist persons who are sincerely interested in peace.

Now let us look more closely at some of the policies advocated in this phony Communist peace offensive. What are the planks in the platform?

First, the subject of atomic weapons is a popular one. At their Stockholm meeting, the partisans of peace appealed for a banning of atomic

weapons. This has been a standard theme since then. Well, who is really against banning atomic weapons? Just examine the history of efforts in the United Nations to assure the control of atomic energy and make possible a real abolition of atomic weapons. The statement of the participating powers on their attempts at negotiation with the Soviet Union on atomic energy control is eloquent on this subject.

It states:

It is apparent that there is a fundamental difference not only on methods but also on aims. All of the Sponsoring Powers, other than the U.S.S.R., put world security first and are prepared to accept innovations in traditional concepts of international cooperation, national sovereignty, and economic organization where these are necessary for security. The Government of the U.S.S.R. puts its sovereignty first and is unwilling to accept measures which may impinge upon or interfere with its rigid exercise of unimpeded state sovereignty. If this fundamental difference could be overcome, other differences which have hitherto appeared unsurmountable could be seen in true perspective, and reasonable ground might be found for their adjustment.

Yet the partisans of peace sought to delude the peoples of the world into thinking that a Communist paper pledge would insure against atomic attack. What is needed, of course, is not a declaration against the use of the atom bomb but an effective system of control and inspection. Yet all efforts in the United Nations to secure agreement on such a system have been frustrated by the Soviet Union, and the Soviet Union alone.

The United Nations Atomic Energy Commission drafted a plan for the control of atomic energy which was approved in 1948 by an overwhelming majority of the General Assembly. Since then, it has twice been reaffirmed by even larger majorities.

If these partisans of peace were actually concerned about the use of atomic weapons, why did they not address themselves to this plan? Is it because the Soviet Union is not really interested in effective control? Is it because, while calling for the outlawing of the bomb, they have maintained a standing army far outnumbering that of any of the world powers today? One could speculate that they exploited the universal abhorrence of the atomic bomb to try to weaken us in the one field—technical proficiency—that could be matched against their larger land armies.

Second, the World Peace Council, now brazenly says it is against aggression. The earlier version of the Stockholm Appeal failed to condemn aggression. Now, they say they are against aggression, but they condemn the United Nations for having declared the Chinese Communists to be aggressors in Korea. The Cominform asks for "peace" at meetings of the partisans of peace in Stockholm, Paris, Warsaw, or in Berlin. At the same time, they attempt to intimidate Yugoslavia and they actually succeed in instigating armed aggression against the Republic of Korea.

It is revealing to note that just before the North Koreans launched their unprovoked attack against

the Republic of Korea, more than half the population of North Korea was reported to have signed the Stockholm petition. This illustrates the basic hypocrisy of the Communist "peace appeal." The Soviet concept of world peace means the absence of any opposition to the ever-expanding Soviet drive for power.

Third, the organization is now campaigning for a five-power peace pact, a favorite Soviet proposition. The Five Powers would be the United States, the United Kingdom, France, the Soviet Union, and Red China. They state that failure to meet for the purpose of signing a peace pact between the Big Five would be evidence of aggressive intentions. A campaign is under way to secure signatures which will, in their own words, "create" a movement of public opinion powerful enough to force discussion and final conclusion of a "peace pact."

These techniques are so important to Moscow that the Cominform journal, the organ of international communism, stated that the collection of these signatures is "the main paramount task" of international communism. It is interesting to note that a campaign to collect these signatures in North Korea was announced just a few days before the latest Communist offensive against United Nations forces in Korea.

It is nonsensical to say that complex problems can be worked out if only Five Powers would sit down at a conference table and talk them out. Ever since the end of World War II, we have been and are still attempting to do this. We have held six meetings of the Council of Foreign Ministers in an attempt to settle our differences. But Soviet intransigence was just as marked at the last as it was at the first.

In Paris, the Deputy Foreign Ministers are meeting in an attempt to secure agreement on an objective agenda on limited issues. After 8 weeks—8 weeks—the Soviet representatives have not yet agreed to a simple agenda which would serve as a basis of discussion between the Big Four.

We sit at the council tables at Lake Success, day in and day out, in an effort to collaborate on the peaceful settlement of disputes. There is something more fundamental involved than simply trying to talk things out. We have witnessed Soviet tactics of subversion and obstruction, in and out of the United Nations. If the Soviet Union will not carry out its existing obligations, what reason is there to assume that they would honor a new peace pact. The Charter itself is the most solemn peace pact in history. Why do we need a new one?

Fourth, they ask that the United Nations return "to the role assigned it by the Charter," namely, that it serve as an area of agreement between governments. They assert that it now acts as an instrument of a "dominant group."

The Soviet Union's activities in the United Nations have been 100 percent negative in the political field, in the economic and social fields, in the

fields of disarmament and atomic energy. Not only have they offered no constructive program in the United Nations; they have consistently attempted to subvert the organization to their own propaganda purposes. When they talk about the United Nations, check what they say against the telltale record of their performance. There is no doubt about who is out of step.

Nevertheless, in spite of Soviet obstruction, the United Nations has important achievements to its credit. Among these are the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Iranian territory in 1946; the successful conclusion of the Netherlands-Indonesian dispute, resulting in the establishment of an independent Indonesia; the cease-fires in Palestine and in Kashmir, the contribution through its close surveillance and active concern to the independence of Greece; and, more dramatically, the defense of the Republic of Korea.

Fourteen members of the United Nations now have fighting forces in Korea alongside the gallant Koreans. Reinforcements from these and other countries are on the way or will soon be on the way. Three other countries have medical units in Korea. Forty-one countries have furnished or pledged nonmilitary assistance to the Koreans. As a result of this collective effort, the Communist aggressors have twice been rolled back to behind the point where the original aggression started. I am confident that we will give a good account of ourselves in the current fighting.

No, the United Nations has not, as Marshal Stalin said he feared, gone the inglorious way of the League of Nations and failed to meet aggression. But the aggression, which it met and is in the process of repelling, is a Communist aggression. Is this, perhaps, why the Soviets have stepped up the tempo of their campaign against the United Nations, particularly, after the United Nations branded the Chinese Communist aggressors in February?

Answering Soviet Charges Against U.N.

The Soviet charge that the United Nations has disappointed the peoples of the world comes from the nation which has caused such disappointment as exists by its threats and use of force; its subversive and conspiratorial methods; its refusal to cooperate; its propaganda of hatred; and its misuse of a great idea for its own purposes.

The Soviets charge that the United Nations has failed because it has turned into a docile instrument of United States policy. This is nothing but an absurd way of saying that the majority of free nations of the world have been alert to Soviet subversion. The voting record in the United Nations reflects the unity of the democracies against the vociferous minority of the Soviets and their satellites.

The United States cannot honestly be blamed because other nations find their interests at odds

with those of the Soviet Union. The Soviets are themselves responsible. Their unreasonable and uncompromising positions have engendered a real fear among the majority of the members of the United Nations. An eloquent statement of this was made by Paul Henri Spaak, former Belgian Foreign Minister, when, in reply to Mr. Vyshinsky, he said:

I must answer you. I think I am the one to do it, because no one could consider that Belgium is trying to be provocative against the Soviet Union. We are afraid because by your conduct you have rendered this organization (the United Nations) ineffective. We are afraid because the problems before this Assembly have remained unsolved; because, even when a solution is proposed by a majority of the United Nations, you have refused to adhere to this solution. We are afraid because we have placed all our hopes and confidence in the defensive organization of the United Nations; and through the policy you have pursued, you are forbidding us to seek our security and our salvation within the framework of this organization, but making us seek it within the framework of a regional arrangement. We are afraid of you because, in every country represented here, you are maintaining a fifth column, beside which the Hitlerite fifth column is nothing but a boy scout organization, if I might say so. There is not a single spot in the world whether in Asia, whether in Europe, or whether in Africa, where a government represented here fails to find difficulties, and these difficulties are being made still further aggravated by you . . .

Fundamental political and security decisions of the United Nations have been supported by the vast majority of members including countries with such diverse interests as the American Republics, the Asian states, and the Arab states. Their decisions are arrived at through democratic means in the give and take of free discussion. Differences of opinion, in degree, do, of course, exist. I believe that this is proof, however, of the democratic nature of the organization.

In organizing its phoney "peace" campaign, what has the Kremlin in mind concerning the future of the United Nations? That is anybody's guess on this side of the iron curtain. This "peace" campaign professes a wish to bring the United Nations back to its original purposes. In this manner the World Peace Council seeks to discredit the United Nations and thus lessen the stigma of the United Nations' denunciation of the North Korean and Chinese Communist aggression.

By building up their World Peace Council, the Soviets seek to exert propaganda pressure against the United Nations—a sort of blackmail. It is perhaps significant that the last North Korean message to the United Nations, contained in a lengthy document in the Russian language, carefully followed the line being voiced by the World Peace Council.

However, in spite of the Soviet record, we are not willing to give up hope for peace. We are willing to continue to try to settle differences with them by negotiation. We believe this should be done largely through the United Nations. We are not, however, blind to Soviet aims and tactics, and we must not allow them to subvert the United Na-

tions to their ends. We have fought their attempts to do this since 1945 and will continue our efforts to strengthen the United Nations as an effective organization on world peace.

We of the free world have worked consistently to further man's desire for peace, freedom, economic betterment, and security. We will not be deceived by broad statements of the Soviet-dominated Peace Council.

Let's be sure they are made to explain what they mean by peace. Let's be sure it isn't acquiescence in Soviet imperialism. Let's be sure we are not lulled into a false sense of security by a declaration outlawing the atomic bomb without an effective system of inspection and control. Let's be sure they do not succeed in sowing dissatisfaction within the United Nations.

If they insist on slandering the United Nations, we must lay the blame for the inadequacies of that organization squarely where it belongs—on the Soviet Union and its policies of obstruction and subversion. We must block the Kremlin's efforts to deceive and divide.

What do the Soviets mean by peace? Look at the record of the past 6 years. The kind of peace the Soviets have in mind is clear. Soviet peace means the fall of democratic Czechoslovakia, the blockade of Berlin, aggression by satellites, the extinction of human rights and fundamental freedoms in all areas which they control, and brazen defiance of the United Nations Charter.

Let no one be deceived by the World Peace Council. It is an organ of Soviet foreign policy. It is a tool of the phony "peace" offensive.

The real peace offensive is being waged by those who honestly support the United Nations. This was well put by the Secretary-General, Trygve Lie, in the course of replying to Joliet-Curie:

The United Nations is working for collective security against armed aggression. The United Nations is working for the peaceful settlement of international differences by negotiation, mediation, and conciliation. The United Nations is working for the control and reduction of armaments and the elimination of weapons of mass destruction under an international control system that will protect all nations against violations and evasions. The United Nations is working to give freedom, bread, security, and opportunity for improvement of their lot to all the hungry, the poor, the oppressed, and the frightened people of the world. Finally, the United Nations stands for the principle of universality and seeks to apply the doctrine of the peaceful coexistence of all kinds of systems and cultures which is talked about so much and—outside the United Nations—practiced so little in the world today.

It is the first duty, therefore, of every peace-loving man and woman in the world to give their support to the United Nations, to seek to persuade all governments to give respect and compliance to all its decisions and recommendations, and to use every opportunity to spread and to strengthen its influence for peace. Conversely, those whose actions tend to weaken the United Nations, to undermine its authority, to sharpen the discords that are inevitably present in a world organization—they are no true friends of peace no matter what they profess to be.

. . . Support the United Nations with understanding and loyalty, and you shall have peace.

Outlook and Tasks Ahead for Germany

OUTLINE OF UNITED STATES POLICIES

by John J. McCloy

United States High Commissioner for Germany¹

Six years ago, the obstacles of the rebuilding of Germany seemed to be staggering. The tasks of restoring order from chaos, of preventing the starvation and death of millions of people, of cleaning up the physical and moral debris of war looked almost hopeless.

Progress Since 1945

Look at your country today. It is easy to criticize, but you must see the situation in perspective. The progress since 1945 is astounding. More people are now gainfully employed than ever before in Western Germany. Hundreds of thousands of new dwellings are going up everywhere in the Federal Republic. Restrictions on almost all kinds of production, including shipbuilding, have fallen. Much, to be sure, remains to be done to reduce unemployment, to reach a better equilibrium in the price-wage scale, to provide more housing. But the simple fact is that your economy provides you with unrationed food, clothing, and other consumer goods on a scale at least equal to that of other Western European countries and far greater than that achieved anywhere behind the iron curtain. Politically, you have created a free democratic community in the Federal Republic. The individual is safe from the arbitrary will of one man or of one party. Men and women are free to speak and to take active part in the affairs of their country.

The Bundes Republic is gaining increasing respect abroad. Your position as a full member of the European Council now seems assured. Two weeks ago, your Chancellor was received in Paris as an honored guest to negotiate on a basis of equality with the ministers of five other European countries. The rebirth of Germany in the past

6 years has been a great constructive accomplishment. It has been the result of hard work by the German people and their representatives, aided by the great economic and moral contribution from the free world. It has been achieved without slave labor, without fear of a secret police, without false promises of 5-year plans. If there were a way to do so, a vast majority of the millions of Germans in the East zone would try to share in the economic and political progress made by the Bundes Republic.

The outside world has noted these achievements of postwar Germany. The German people should take pride in them. The fact that Germany is obliged to pay a portion of the costs involved in the occupation or that a peace treaty is not in the immediate offing does not lessen these gains. The threat posed by the Communists by their control of the East zone makes the situation here much more complicated, for example, take the case of Japan.

The Task Ahead for Germany and U.S. Policies

In the next period, the task of Germany will be twofold; first, to maintain and extend at home the gains already achieved, especially in strengthening and modernizing economic and political institutions. The second main task is to forge strong and enduring links with the free world. In this connection, I want to outline to you briefly how the policies of the United States in Germany are designed to help carry out these tasks:

INTEGRATION WITH FREE EUROPEAN COUNTRIES

1. It is the policy of the United States to support the integration of Germany with the other free countries of Europe. The European countries themselves must join together to solve their joint problems. Here, the Schuman Plan rep-

¹ Address made over the Bavarian Radio on Apr. 25 and released to the press on the same date.

resents a striking example of the possibilities of such cooperation. In American eyes, the Schuman Plan is a test of the sincerity and ability of European countries to act as one community.

In a basic sector of the European economy, the Schuman Plan will consolidate the economic strength of Western Europe, free markets, and develop new economic opportunities. It will create employment, not unemployment. It is fantastic to assert, as some have, that the United States, which has poured billions into Germany to help revive production, would favor a plan to put people out of work or hamper German industrial development. Politically, it marks Germany's emergence as an equal partner in a great European project. If this bold, imaginative concept were rejected, it would be a serious and perhaps fatal blow to the hopes built up slowly during the past few years. It would create the danger of a disunited, weak Europe and an isolated Germany.

Farsighted leadership on both sides of the Rhine has carried the Schuman Plan concept thus far. It is now a matter for debate by the various parliaments. I hope that, through this process, all of you will become fully aware of the character of the plan and its high objectives.

RESISTANCE OF ARMED ATTACK

2. It is the policy of the United States to assure men peace and to deter aggression by supporting and participating in the effort to create a strong Western European security system. It is our policy to resist any armed attack on West Germany or West Berlin.

The necessity for defense preparations is an unpleasant fact we must all face. Korea has shown—and the new Communist offensive shown again—that aggression in any part of the world affects European and German security.

The NATO [North Atlantic Treaty Organization] forces are being built up in Europe to deter aggression not to institute it. The power of the Western World will come into action only in the event of aggression against any member. But, if attacked, the power of each country will become the strength of all.

PARTICIPATION IN EUROPEAN DEFENSE SYSTEM

3. The United States recognized the right of Germany to participate in her own and in the common defense within an integrated European defense system under conditions of equality.

We are firmly opposed to any revival of German militarism or of any German Army which would be independent of an international security system and we, together with the German people, will guard carefully against any such development.

We believe that German participation in an integrated European force is a decision which

the German Government and people must make for themselves. We are not attempting to buy or force and do not intend to buy or force such participation.

We believe it must be obvious to the German people that the nature and the efficacy and extent to which Germany can be protected depends in a large measure on German participation in its own defense. Neutrality has never been an effective bar to aggression against an unprotected country.

SUPPORT FOR DEMOCRATIC ELEMENTS

4. It is the policy of the United States to support the development of a democratic Germany and to aid all democratic elements in Germany to safeguard against the revival of nazism or the imposition of communism. The German people have shown their rejection of communism in every free election which has taken place in Germany. Once identified, the Communist approach is always repudiated. This is now so clear that the Communists have resorted to their familiar tactic of using false fronts, such as neutrality, pacifism, and peace plebiscites to cover up their own imperialistic designs. These attempts are cynical frauds, just as the Communist cry for German unity is a fraud when, at the same time, free elections are outlawed.

Equally sinister is the threat from other totalitarian groups composed in large part of former Nazi activists. In certain areas of Germany, small groups are again trying to spread the evil doctrines, the old slogans and tactics, which brought Germany to ruin and will do so again if they should ever prevail. The German people, through their democratic governments, must be aware of these developments and be prepared to deal effectively with them. The German people cannot ever again permit such forces to gain control in their country, nor will the democratic world permit it.

ASSISTANCE TO GERMAN YOUTH

5. It is the policy of the United States to help German youth to recognize that its future opportunities can be found only in a democratic Germany within a great European community in a united, free world.

We recognize that a majority of German youth is eager to attach its loyalties to affirmative objectives; that it will not be deceived again by glittering promises that only a decade ago caused the destruction of its hopes and ideals. For that reason, the United States has made large contributions, including financial support, to German organizations which assist youth. We do not seek to control, to propagandize, or to regiment youth. We seek only to give German youth a chance for a better life.

For their part, the German people and their governments—city, kreis, land, and bund—should,

in my judgment, take greater interest in the problems of youth, spend more money on projects to help youth, and give youth greater opportunity for self-development. Young men and women should not be barred by their elders from office simply because of their youth, restricted in their participation in public affairs, or have their freedom to engage in a trade or profession arbitrarily circumscribed.

AID AND STRENGTH FOR CITY OF BERLIN

6. It is the policy of the United States to help the city of Berlin. The free world has been profoundly impressed by the fortitude of the people of Berlin and in their determination to stand up

for and defend their freedom. I hope and I am confident that the Bundes Republic will do everything possible to aid the city and strengthen ties with it.

These aims of the United States are not complex, and in no one of them is there the slightest suggestion of aggrandizement or extension of American power.

The condition of our aid, the condition of the maintenance of our policy is likewise simple. It demands only that the German people and their Government put their great energies and capacities into the making of a liberal, tolerant community, in which all men can walk with dignity and freedom.

German Federal Republic's Monthly Economic Review ¹

In February, a substantial decline in unemployment and an increase in the daily rate of coal production indicated that the economy of Western Germany was beginning to revive from its mid-winter slump. Economic policy also reached a turning point with the Federal Government's decision to suspend trade liberalization in order to curb the mounting deficit with the European Payments Union. The issuance of licenses for quota imports was also suspended and the Bank Deutscher Laender initiated a stringent program for the reduction of (short-term) debt.

Industrial production in January registered another decline (2.4 percent), largely as a result of seasonal factors, coal and power shortages, and the beginning of certain raw material shortages. Employment during February rose mainly because of revived building activity. Labor continued to push its claims for wage increases comparable to the rise in the cost of living, and to press for co-determination, extending its demand to the chemical industry and railways, as well as iron, steel and coal.

Foreign Trade

West German exports and imports decreased in January. Exports of \$217,500,000 represented a decline of \$23,700,000 from December to reach the lowest level since last October. The export decline carried added significance as the first monthly decline since April 1950. Imports of \$295,400,000

in January were \$19,400,000 less than in December. The most important developments by area were:

USA.—Exports of \$14,400,000 and imports of \$39,200,000 were both slightly below December figures.

Other Western Hemisphere.—Trade was maintained at a high level as exports (\$23,200,000) were only \$500,000 less, while imports (\$25,500,000) were \$500,000 higher than in the previous month.

Marshall Plan Countries.—Most of the decline in both exports and imports in January was in trade with the Marshall Plan countries. Although January exports to sterling participants (\$15,900,000) were greater than in December, those to non-sterling participants declined to \$126,100,000, the lowest amount since September 1950. Imports from both sterling (\$31,700,000) and non-sterling (\$142,600,000) participants declined, and the total for imports from Marshall Plan countries (\$174,300,000) was also the lowest since September.

Sterling Countries outside Marshall Plan.—Exports (\$10,900,000) declined \$2,400,000, but imports (mostly raw materials) continued to rise, reaching \$23,800,000 in January.

Eastern Europe.—Exports (\$7,600,000) to and imports (\$10,300,000) from the Soviet Bloc countries fell off, while exports to Yugoslavia (\$7,800,000) were almost triple the figure for December.

Commoditywise, food and agriculture exports (\$14,300,000) were almost double the December total, but the finished goods component, the key item in West German exports, declined by \$24,300,000 to \$145,800,000. On the import side, all

¹ Reprinted from the April issue of the *Information Bulletin*; prepared by the Analytical Reports Branch of the Program Review Division of the Office of Economic Affairs, HICOG.

major commodity groups shared equally in the decline.

Reasons for the adverse foreign trade developments in January were seasonal—there were less working days, for workers took long vacations at New Year; there were the normal post-Christmas slump, and the usual cold weather impediments to trade. Although the January decline in exports followed the December drop in German production, it is too early to assess the degree to which raw material shortages, international and domestic, were responsible for this development.

Dollar export figures to the United States and Canada in December disclose that of the total of \$15,700,000 exported to the United States, five commodity groups (pig iron, \$1,600,000; steel pipes and tubes, \$1,500,000; sheet iron, \$1,000,000; ferrous scrap, \$1,000,000 and fine mechanics and optical goods, \$800,000) accounted for \$5,900,000 or almost 40 percent of the total.

Of the December exports to Canada, three commodity groups (ironware, \$323,000; fine mechanics and optical goods, \$103,000; and cutlery and hardware, \$50,000) made up \$476,000 or one-half of the \$872,000 total.

Comparison with a year ago reveals that, for the major items, as the level of West German production and trade has risen, emphasis in exports to the United States has shifted away from scarce non-ferrous metals and semi-manufactured goods toward iron and steel mill products. Exceptions to this development are ferrous scrap, the export of which is a postwar phenomenon and of which about 30 percent of the total export to all countries went to the United States in December, and fine mechanics and optical goods, a traditional German export to the United States and Canada.

WEST GERMAN FOREIGN COMMODITY TRADE

January 1951

(Thousand Dollars)

CATEGORIES		Imports	Exports
Food and Agriculture		112,363	14,263
Industry		183,048	203,275
Raw Materials		104,437	22,965
Semifinished Goods		41,110	34,494
Finished Goods		37,501	145,816
Total		295,411	217,538
AREA			
Total Non-Participating Countries		121,146	75,150
USA		39,189	14,378
Canada		1,197	1,010
Latin America		24,309	22,204
Non-participating Sterling Countries		23,830	10,910
Soviet Bloc (incl. China)		10,340	7,619
Yugoslavia and Finland		4,203	9,417
Other Countries		18,078	9,612
Participating Countries		174,264	141,941
Non-Sterling		142,590	126,059
Sterling		31,674	15,882
Unspecified		1	447
Total		295,411	217,538
IMPORT SURPLUS: January \$77,873,000.			

Foreign Payments Position

On Feb. 22, the German government announced temporary suspension of trade liberalization in an attempt to stem the mounting deficit

with the European Payments Union (EPU). During the month the deficit swelled by approximately \$58,000,000 as against \$42,000,000 in January. This peak deficit occurred in a month when it was expected that Western Germany's payments would begin to break even. The total cumulative deficit has now reached \$457,000,000. The rate of licensing for liberalized imports continued at the high level reached during the second half of January and the value of tenders issued in February by the German Import Advisory Committee for non-liberalized imports were almost double the January figure. Although the rate of licensing increased with the dropping of the deposit requirement from 50 percent to 25 percent, the main impetus was the continuation of excessive demand for imported goods, due to the lack of stringent credit restrictions and a virtual discontinuance of savings. As a result of these developments, the German government decided on Feb. 22 to suspend temporarily issuance of liberalized licenses. At a special meeting on Feb. 23, the EPU Managing Board accepted Germany's suspension of liberalization and requested the Federal Government to submit its program of measures to counteract the developments which led to the suspension. On Feb. 27, the suspension of licensing was extended to the quota items imported from EPU countries, and the issuance of foreign exchange allocation certificates was suspended.

Industrial Production

In January, industrial activity slackened further, still beset by persisting coal and power shortages and seasonal factors. Shortage of raw materials, an additional handicap, is beginning to make itself felt. Bottlenecks in the supply of power and raw materials are not only restricting output, but also preventing expansion of employment in many manufacturing establishments. On the other hand, however, orders received remained well above the value of current sales, although a three percent drop was recorded for December.

The federal index of industrial production (excluding building, stimulants and food processing) declined three points (2.4 percent) from the December figure to 126 of the 1936 level. The decreasing trend in production during the last two months has followed generally that of a year ago when industrial activity fell abruptly in December, slightly less in January and began increasing in February. This year, however, the rate of change is sharper. The usual holiday and seasonal factors affecting this decline were augmented during 1950 by coal, power and raw material shortages, the last of which is now beginning to restrict output by industrial users of non-ferrous metals, rubber, rayon, wool and sulphate.

As the winter passes, indications are that the trend of production should level off in February and improve in the coming months. Of the 30 industry groups for which data are available, 21

showed decreases in production during January, while nine showed increases.

INDEX OF INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION

1936=100

	1950	1951	
	Nov.	Dec.	Jan.
TOTAL ALL INDUSTRIES			
(incl. electricity and gas 1/)	135	r129	126
(excl. electricity and gas 1/)	132	125	122
Investment goods (total)	136	r129	123
Raw materials	106	r 94	91
Finished products	155	r150	143
General production goods			
(incl. electricity and gas)	142	r140	139
(excl. electricity and gas)	131	127	126
Consumer goods	125	r117	116

1/-Excluding food processing, stimulants and building.
r = Revised.

PRODUCTION OF MAJOR COMMODITIES

COMMODITY	Unit of Measure 1/	1950		1951 Jan. p/
		Nov. r/	Dec. r/	
Hard coal (gross mined)	thous. t	10,022	9,585	10,138
Crude petroleum	t	97,793	103,050	102,176
Cement	thous. t	1,010	735	599
Bricks (total)	1,000	411,691	319,109	247,790
Pig iron	t	864,296	766,149	801,003
Steel ingots	t	1,080,868	929,952	1,011,968
Rolled steel finished products	t	792,755	675,795	745,097
Farm tractors (total 2/)	pieces	5,221	5,197	5,670
Office machines	t	622	552	613
Passenger cars (incl. chassis)	pieces	22,016	20,613	23,028
Cameras (total)	pieces	202,838	139,948	178,055
Sulphuric acid (incl. oleum)	t-SO ₃	108,313	114,078	110,779
Calcium carbide	t	40,024	44,724	37,737
Soap (total)	t	8,618	6,784	11,779
Newsprint	t	14,564	13,173	13,641
Auto and truck tires	pieces	331,743	289,033	283,591
Shoes (total)	1,000 pairs	9,409	7,431	7,209

1/-All tons are metric tons.

2/-Excluding accessories, parts and spare parts.

r = Revised.

p = Preliminary.

Coal

The fuel shortage is still a serious handicap to the expansion of output and has been reported as cause for cutting production and employment in some industries. (See Industrial Production above.) During February, however, a favorable upward trend began in hard coal output. With 24 working days in February, daily average production reached a record level of 384,164 tons. This brought production for the month to 9,445,803 tons, with only 258,632 tons reported as extra shift production. Factors believed contributing to the increase in the rate of production are: approximately 1,000 additional miners, a decrease in the number of shifts lost and a decline in the absenteeism rate.

Germany's coal export quota for the second quarter of 1951 was fixed at 6,200,000 tons by the Council of the International Authority for the Ruhr at its Feb. 16 meeting. Two assumptions underlying this quota were that 900,000 tons would be exported to the Saar in exchange for equivalent imports from that area, and that 200,000 tons of coal would be imported from the United States during the quarter.

Despite the short month, aluminum production in February remained at 3,500 tons, and was expected to reach 4,000 tons in March. With sufficient water supply, aluminum smelters increased production. The zinc, lead and copper smelters,

with sufficient supplies of raw materials and coal, have been able to maintain production. A serious contraction was expected in April, however, when present difficulties in obtaining raw materials and shipping space were expected to come to a climax.

The Federal Republic law for the control of raw materials is not yet in force, and until a tighter control on the end-use of scarce materials is introduced, increasing difficulties in obtaining United States export licenses must be expected.

Production in the chemical industry continues to drop, restricted by the shortage of coal and raw materials. Manufacturers' stocks of coal are down by one to four days' supply, with some firms operating intermittently, depending upon coal deliveries. Some coal has been purchased from the United States with free dollars, urea traded for French coal, and soda traded for Belgian coal. The production index for the chemical industry has been dropping steadily from the high of 138 in November to an expected 110 or lower in February. As a result, the chemical industry is cutting employment and producing less for export.

Other than coal, the main shortages are sulphur and chlorine. The allocation of only 36.8 percent of the German requirements of United States sulphur will seriously affect the production of carbondisulphide for textiles and sulphur available as insecticide for the vineyards. An Allied working party is investigating Germany's need for additional chlorine capacity.

Mild weather with heavy rains increased hydroelectric power available during February, so that the shortage of power was not as acute as in January. Coal allocations continued to be insufficient, and coal stocks remained at only 13 days' supply—below a safe point for this season of the year. As a consequence, power restrictions imposed in January were continued through February, but were reduced to a certain extent in some Laender (states) where the supply of hydroelectricity increased. Despite these restrictions, power consumption in February was 19 percent higher than in February of last year. Fifty MW new capacity, financed by ECA counterpart funds, was placed in service during the month.

Cold weather in February reduced crude oil production below the January level. Refinery output also showed a reduction during the month, resulting from fuel shortage and refinery repairs. Stocks of gasoline showed no essential change. February consumption, increasing 10,000 tons over January, was estimated at 105,000 tons, and receipts from domestic and foreign sources were estimated at 174,000 tons. Stocks were expected to increase considerably by March 1. Diesel oil stocks, however, do not indicate this favorable development. By Feb. 1, stocks decreased by 31,000 tons, and decreased further during the month. February consumption, 7,000 tons less than in January, was estimated at 115,000 tons, and receipts were estimated at only 75,000 tons.

Transportation and Communication

Traffic demands on the Bundesbahn remained at a comparatively high level in February, averaging 59,000 cars per workday. At the same time, the number of serviceable cars dropped to 251,000 cars (253,000 in January; 262,300 in December; and November high 264,500). Workshops cannot keep abreast of the increasing number of un-serviceable cars. This development was fully foreseen in the fall of 1950 when the Bundesbahn, to meet heavy harvest traffic demands, deferred all repairs on running equipment. By so doing, it kept more than 260,000 cars in traffic. As a consequence, the Bundesbahn could not meet February demands in full—a fact causing particular concern, since traffic demands for any European railway are usually lighter for February than for any other month of the year.

The Bundesbahn and the Federal Government are aware that both new cars and a stepped-up freight car repair program are requisites. The major difficulty still facing the Bundesbahn is the immediate need for new capital to finance a freight car construction program and the continued rehabilitation of war damages, since such programs cannot be financed out of profits from current Bundesbahn operations.

The month of February saw a combined effort of the three Allied Powers, in conjunction with the Federal Ministry for Posts and Telecommunications, to standardize and make uniform all procedures for the procurement and payment of communications facilities and services rendered the Allied Forces by the Deutsche Post. This involves major changes in the procedures currently being followed by each of the three authorities with relation to the ordering of long distance circuits, local service and equipment, and modification of accounting and billing procedures.

The primary objective of this entire program is to bring current procedures in line with the overall policy surrounding the inauguration of the national budget principle. When completed it will permit each of the three Allied authorities to procure its own services directly from the Deutsche Post, regardless of location and to reimburse the Deutsche Post from its own budget.

During January the Bundespost continued to make progress on its telecommunications plant construction program. Six new manual and two automatic central office exchanges were brought into operation, and work was completed on extensions to five manual and 20 automatic exchanges plus extensions to seven long distance trunk exchanges. These new facilities will relieve, to some extent, the present shortage of telecommunication facilities in the Federal Republic.

Labor

The labor market situation as of mid-February 1951 was exceptionally good. Employment was

higher than ever before at this time of year. This also applied to the building trades, which had slumped badly in December and early January.

Employment statistics reflect fundamentally favorable business conditions. With substantial orders on hand, employers are not discharging workers when temporary shortages of coal and raw materials retard production. Public employment exchange officials believe that if the Federal Government allows the speculative maldistribution of raw materials and half-fabricates to grow more serious, employment will soar to new heights before June.

Registered unemployment declined in February by almost 160,000, thus bringing the total decrease since the turning point in mid-January to approximately 250,000. At the end of February, unemployment stood at 1,663,000, or about 27,000 less than at the close of 1950. Comparisons with the early part of 1950 reveal the recent unemployment development has actually been a very favorable one. At the end of February 1950, unemployment was still hovering around the 2,000,000 mark, and was 425,000 higher than in December 1949. It was not until the end of May 1950 that unemployment was reduced to 1,668,300—the end of February 1951 is already 5,000 below this figure.

Furthermore, the unemployment rate is now significantly lower than in February 1950, when dependent employment was approximately 1,000,000 less than the present level. In February 1951, the rate of unemployment in terms of the wage and salary-earning labor force was 10.5 percent as against 13.1 percent last year.

Seasonal factors, which were primarily responsible for rising unemployment between the end of October 1950 and mid-January 1951, also account largely for the recent reversal in trend. The major part of the decline in unemployment has come in outdoor occupations such as building and construction, including public works projects, and in agriculture.

Significantly, however, there has also been a drop in unemployment in manufacturing, also due mainly to seasonal factors, and in commerce and transportation. Among the manufacturing industries which would probably show higher employment for February are stones and earths, metal working industries, including those related to the building trade, woodworking, clothing, food processing and leather. Employment in other branches of manufacturing is undergoing little change.

With much less fanfare than in the latter half of 1950, a new wage drive of considerable proportions is underway. Pay boosts were obtained in February by approximately 775,000 industrial workers, and negotiations are proceeding for employees in public administration and services. Notification of termination of collective agreements, effective in March or April, has been given in the building, textile and clothing, and the shoe

industries in the federal area. The Woodworking Union is reportedly considering similar action.

The unions present the rise in consumer prices during recent months as their reason for demanding wage increases. The official consumer price index rose by 2.6 percent between October and January, and consumer prices continued to increase in February.

Commodity Price Indexes

In January, the three major price indexes all rose sharply. The basic materials price index showed the sharpest rise since September—an increase of 11 points (4.8 percent) to a new high of 240 percent of the 1938 level. The industrial component of the basic materials price index (up 14 points—5.3 percent—to 279) is now 30 percent above the level of a year ago, with practically all of that rise occurring since the beginning of the Korean War. The agricultural component (up only six points—5.4 percent—to 182) is eight percent above the index of a year ago, with the entire rise occurring in the last seven months.

The index of industrial producers prices (up 11 points—5.6 percent—to 206 in January) has risen by 13 percent during the past year; the largest gains noted were in textiles and clothing (up 30 percent), and iron, steel and non-ferrous metals (up 27 percent).

The index of consumer prices for January 1951 (up three points to 154 percent of 1938) stands at almost the same level as a year ago, having declined almost continuously during the first nine months of the year before beginning a steady rise in September 1950.

CONSUMER PRICE INDEX (BIZONAL AREA^{1/})

1938=100

(Wage/salary earner's family of four, with one child under 14)

	1950			1951
	Dec.	Jan.	Feb.	
TOTAL	151	154	156	
Food	155	157	159	
Stimulants	275	275	275	
Clothing	192	197	203	
Rent	103	103	103	
Heat and light	119	121	122	
Cleaning and hygiene	149	151	154	
Education and entertainment	142	143	145	
Household goods	165	171	177	
Traveling	133	148	151	

1/—The Consumer Price Index is not yet available on a Trizonal basis.

INDEX OF INDUSTRIAL PRODUCERS PRICES

Bizonal Area

1938=100

	1950			1951
	Nov.	Dec.	Jan.	
TOTAL	189	195	206	

BASIC MATERIALS PRICE INDEX

1938=100

	1950			1951
	Nov.	Dec.	Jan.	p/
Food	177	176	182	
Industry	256	265	279	
TOTAL	224	229	240	

p/=Preliminary.

Finance

The DM 186,000,000 increase in short term bank credit outstanding in January, was considerably less than the prior month's expansion of DM 250,000,000. Direct Central Bank credits outstanding totaled DM 1,311,000,000 in January, a significant drop below the December total of DM 1,580,000,000.

The following restrictive measures were introduced by the Bank Deutscher Laender on Jan. 31, 1951, in an attempt to improve the foreign payments situation and to redress the position of certain banks which had over-extended their credit operations. The immediate aim of these measures is to curtail the volume of bank credit outstanding:

(1) Short term business credits not to exceed capital and reserves more than 30 times;

(2) Current account and acceptance credits not to exceed 70 percent of deposits, capital and reserves;

(3) Acceptance credits not to exceed capital and reserves by more than seven times (in certain instances, three times); and

(4) Liquid assets (cash on hand and on deposit with the Central Bank and Post, checks, bills of exchange and treasury bills) not to fall below 20 percent of deposits and acceptances.

It is too early to ascertain how these restrictions will affect the development of commercial bank credit and the money supply.

A decrease in January of DM 410,000,000 (estimated) in the volume of money was noted over December's revised totals. This compares with a DM 68,000,000 revised monthly increase in November and a DM 524,000,000 revised monthly increase in December. The January level of excess reserves expressed as a percentage of legal reserves amounts to three percent as compared with December's revised level of 4.8 percent.

Food and Agriculture

A greater than usual amount of snowfall and rain during the winter months has resulted in an increasing amount of soil moisture, which insures the starting of early spring crops. Precipitation and temperatures during February were about normal. No particular damage to fall-sown crops, or to root crops remaining in storage, was reported.

Indications at present point toward a satisfactory crop year in 1951. Some field work was underway during February and full spring operations were expected to start early in March.

During February, the number of cases of foot and mouth disease increased. The disease has not reached critical proportions, however, and vaccine supplies are sufficient to keep it under control.

All shipments from the Federal Republic, under the United States program for expedited aid to Yugoslavia by shipping German-milled flour and

replacing this with equivalent quantities of wheat, were completed early in February.

The two principal items of federal legislation concerned seeds and butter. The Ministry for Food, Agriculture and Forestry issued an ordinance prohibiting the sale, in commercial quantities, of other than certified agricultural and vegetable seeds. The certifying agencies are the state authorities; basic conditions for certification are fixed by the federal minister. Under an ordinance of the minister of economics, maximum butter prices per 100 kg for the different grades, in lots of 25 kg or over, are fixed as follows: if delivered by dairies and wholesalers, DM 498-550; if delivered by retailers, DM 512-564. Allied High Commission decision on both ordinances is pending.

Berlin

Seasonal declines in industry normally recurring in January remained very mild this year and in the latter half of the month were more than compensated by impressive upward trends in iron, steel and malleable castings, in the output of non-ferrous metal foundries, as well as in clothing. Employment, following a decline of more than 8,300 in the first half of January, increased by 3,300 in the second half of the month, and by almost 1,900 in the first half of February. This favorable reversal of the usual seasonal employment trend occurred one month earlier this year than in 1950.

Reports of the Berlin Central Bank indicate that the city's balance of payments position continued to weaken in February. In the past, counterpart funds releases and Federal Republic assistance were usually sufficient to cover this deficit. From time to time, however, small deficits in the city's balance of payments exceeded the external aid to Berlin and were financed by borrowings of the Berlin Central Bank from the Bank Deutscher Laender. About eight percent of the 1950 gap in the payments balance was covered by these credits.

In February, however, it became necessary to borrow substantial additional funds from the Bank Deutscher Laender, although actual transfers to Berlin under the various headings of external assistance were somewhat higher during February than in the previous month (DM 65,000,000 against DM 62,000,000 in January). The Berlin Central Bank's indebtedness to the Bank Deutscher Laender on Feb. 28 amounted to DM 126,700,000 and was DM 29,500,000 higher than on the last day of January.

It was found that a number of firms whose business activities were concentrated in Western Germany, obtained an unduly large portion of their credit requirements from Berlin banks through their Berlin branches or head offices. As a conse-

quence, on Feb. 9, 1951, the rediscount rate was raised from four to six percent, thereby adjusting the Berlin rate to the West German level. It is expected that this will be an important factor in improving Berlin's balance of payments situation.

Procedure for Filing Claims Under Berlin General Claims Law

[Released to the press April 23]

The Department of State wishes to direct the attention of United States residents to the recent promulgation by the Berlin City Assembly of legislation known as the Berlin General Claims Law. The coming into force of this legislation provides a means whereby certain classes of persons, who suffered monetary and other losses in Berlin during the Nazi regime, may receive indemnification for losses falling outside the scope of restitution legislation previously enacted in Berlin. The registry agency is Entschadigungsamt, Fehrbelliner Platz 1, Berlin-Wilmersdorf, Germany. Claims based on this legislation must be filed with that registry agency by January 10, 1952.

The Berlin General Claims Law provides that persons who during the period from January 30, 1933, to May 8, 1945, were persecuted because of political conviction or for racial, religious, or ideological grounds and thereby suffered damage to life and limb, health, liberty, possessions, property, or economic advancement shall be entitled to restitution according to the provisions thereof.

For the city of Berlin to be liable as restitutor, claimants must have had their legitimate domicile or usual residence in Berlin on January 1, 1947, or have been assigned to Berlin as a refugee, or, having had such domicile or residence, have died, emigrated, have been deported, or have been expelled prior to that date.

Persons desiring further information concerning the Berlin General Claims Law should address their inquiries, including requests for copies of the law, to the Entschadigungsamt in Berlin.

Raw Cotton for West Germany

Approximately 109,000 bales of raw cotton are going to German mills under a Marshall Plan purchase approved recently. Reporting procurement figures for the final month of 1950, the ECA said the cotton authorization for Germany represented about 23 percent of the December total. The figure for the month was \$190,300,000, including \$44,100,000 for the German cotton purchase. Deliveries were to have been completed last month.

U.S. Proposes To Submit Disagreement Over Soviet Lend-Lease Settlement to Arbitral Panel

[Released to the press April 27]

The United States today proposed to the Soviet Government that the outstanding disagreement over a lend-lease settlement be submitted to an international arbitration board.

The board would be asked to decide the amount and terms of a financial settlement which the two governments, in 4 years of direct negotiations, have been unable to reach.

The decision of the board, the United States said in a note delivered to the Soviet Ambassador at Washington, Alexander S. Panyushkin, should be final and binding on both parties.

The lengthy negotiations with the Soviet delegation "have yielded little progress," the American note, signed by Secretary of State Dean Acheson, said.

"In order to achieve a solution satisfactory to both sides," the United States proposed that the question of what would be "fair and reasonable terms of financial settlement" be submitted to an arbitral panel of three members. One member of the panel would be appointed by the United States and one member by the U.S.S.R. The third member would be appointed by the President of the International Court of Justice.

The United States note said that the question of lend-lease ships, the return of which was again demanded in the United States note of April 6, 1950, is not included in the arbitration proposal.¹

During the war, the United States furnished lend-lease supplies and services to Russia valued at 10.8 billion dollars. The United States has requested payment only for civilian-type articles which remained in Soviet custody at the end of the war. No request for payment was made for civilian-type articles lost, destroyed, or consumed during the war.

Value of the civilian-type articles in Russian hands at the end of the war has been estimated by the United States, after liberal allowances for losses and depreciation, at 2.6 billion dollars. In an effort to speed the settlement, however, the United States offered to settle for 1 billion dollars and later for 800 million dollars. The final amount offered by Russia was 240 million dollars.

Text of U.S. Note of April 27, 1951

EXCELLENCY: I have the honor to refer to the negotiations between our two Governments for a settlement of the obligations of the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics under the Master Lend-Lease Agreement of June 11, 1942, and specifically to the questions of compensation for lend-lease articles not lost, destroyed or consumed during the war and the terms and conditions under which such articles may be retained by the Soviet Government. The Government of the United States has upon several occasions already demanded the return under Article V of the Master Lend-Lease Agreement of all lend-lease ships and watercraft, particularly in its notes of February 7 and April 6, 1951. The question of ships therefore is not considered herein.

The Government of the United States has requested no payment for "military-type" articles (arms, ammunition and implements of war, exclusive of ships) which may have remained in Soviet custody at the war's end. The position of the Government of the United States, however, has been that the terms of any settlement would reserve the right of the Government of the United States, as set forth in Article V of the Master Lend-Lease Agreement, to the return to the United States by the Soviet Government of such "military-type" articles and would maintain the obligation of the Soviet Government as stipulated in Article III of the Master Lend-Lease Agreement, to obtain the prior consent of the Government of the United States before retransfer of such articles to third parties. The position of the Government of the United States in this matter is in keeping with the settlements already concluded with other Lend-Lease countries having Master Lend-Lease agreements similar to that with the Soviet Government.

The Government of the United States also has requested no payment for "civilian-type" articles lost, destroyed, or consumed during the war. The Government of the United States has requested payment only for those "civilian-type" articles which remained in Soviet custody at the war's end and has offered to transfer title to such

¹ BULLETIN of Apr. 23, 1951. p. 646.

articles in consideration of payment of a mutually satisfactory sum on terms agreed by our two Governments. These "civilian-type" articles consist of lend-lease supplies having a peacetime value to the Soviet economy and remaining under the control of the Soviet Government on September 2, 1945, or subsequently received by it with the exception of ships, "military-type" articles as stated above, and certain lend-lease articles title to which had been transferred to the Soviet Government under the Agreements of May 30, 1945 and October 15, 1945.

In order to provide a basis for determination of the fair value of "civilian-type" articles remaining in Soviet custody at the war's end, the Government of the United States carefully compiled from its own records a detailed estimated inventory of such articles. In preparing this inventory most liberal allowances were made for wartime losses. The value of this inventory at landed cost less most liberal allowances for depreciation amounted to a total of \$2.6 billion. The Government of the United States, in an effort to arrive at a mutually satisfactory sum representing the fair value of these articles to the Soviet peacetime economy, initially proposed the sum of \$1.3 billion repayable in thirty annual installments beginning five years after July 1, 1946, with interest at 2 percent per annum accruing from July 1, 1946 and payable annually thereafter. Subsequently, in a further effort to speed the negotiations to a mutually satisfactory conclusion, the Government of the United States expressed its willingness to accept still lesser sums, first by proposing the amount of \$1 billion and later the amount of \$800 million. Furthermore, in the interest of a prompt settlement, the Government of the United States has repeatedly indicated its readiness to reduce further this sum provided that the Soviet Government on its part would increase its present offer to a sum more nearly reflecting the value of the articles to the Soviet peacetime economy.

The Soviet Government has taken the position that a lend-lease settlement, in the first place, must take into account the Soviet contribution to the victory against the common enemy, and secondly, must conform with other existing lend-lease settlements. The Soviet Government, however, has cited only the settlement with the British Government.

With regard to the first principle put forward by the Soviet Government, the Government of the United States believes that it has given full recognition to the Soviet contribution to the defeat of the common enemy by writing off completely the entire lend-lease contribution of the United States to the Soviet war effort and asking payment only for those "civilian-type" articles remaining in the Soviet Union at the war's end. It is to be noted that total lend-lease assistance provided by the United States to the Soviet Union

during the war amounted to approximately \$10.8 billion and represented a vast contribution of the skills, labor and resources of the United States to assist the peoples of the Soviet Union in the defeat of the aggressor nations. It is also to be noted that the amount of compensation now proposed by the Government of the United States is \$800 million. From these facts it may be clearly seen that the Government of the United States has asked no payment for war-time lend-lease aid totaling approximately \$10 billion. This represents, on the part of the Government of the United States, great recognition of the community of interest of our two Governments in the achievement of the common victory and takes full cognizance of the part played by the Soviet Government in this effort.

With regard to the Soviet contention that a lend-lease settlement must conform to "precedents", specifically the settlement with the British Government, the Government of the United States has invited the attention of the Soviet Government to the fact that the Government of the United States has never agreed to give most-favored-nation treatment in connection with any lend-lease settlement. Nevertheless, the Government of the United States has in fact sought to reach a lend-lease settlement with the Soviet Government on the basis of the same principles which were observed in the settlement with the British Government. In accordance with these principles the British Government was not asked to pay for lend-lease articles lost, destroyed or consumed in the war; nor was payment asked for "military-type" articles remaining in the United Kingdom at the end of the war. Payment was requested only for the fair value of "civilian-type" articles remaining in the United Kingdom at the war's end. The Soviet Government, however, has repeatedly and categorically refused to reach a settlement on the basis of these principles.

It will be recalled in this connection that, unlike the British Government, the Soviet Government while refusing to furnish an inventory of lend-lease articles remaining in existence at the end of the war, has declined also to consider the estimated inventory provided by the Government of the United States as a basis for settlement. The Soviet Government has instead sought to make settlement on the basis of the total lend-lease furnished and has had recourse to extraneous analogies not germane to the British settlement.

The Soviet Government has thus refused to accept the very principles on which it insists and upon which the settlement with the British Government was based. The Government of the United States must, therefore, reject the contention of the Soviet Government that its offer fully conforms to the British settlement.

The Soviet Government, on the basis of its own principles, has offered to pay to the Government of the United States a "global" sum first in the

amount of \$170 million, later increased to \$200 million and more recently has made an offer of \$240 million stated by Soviet representatives to be "final". The Soviet Government proposes that payment of this sum should be made over a period of 50 years with interest at 2 percent per annum, but with payment of interest and principal beginning five years after the conclusion of the agreement. The Government of the United States considers the amount and terms of the offer of the Soviet Government to be inadequate and unreasonable.

In these circumstances the Government of the United States must point out that four years of direct negotiations between our two Governments have yielded little progress toward a settlement of this issue. Therefore, in order to achieve a solution satisfactory to both sides, the Government of the United States proposes that there be submitted to an arbitral panel consisting of three members, one each to be appointed by the Government of the United States and of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and a third member to be appointed by the President of the International Court of Justice, the question of what would be fair and reasonable terms of financial settlement by the Soviet Government for the lend-lease articles having civilian utility, except ships, which were not lost, destroyed or consumed during the war and which are not returned to the United States.

The Government of the United States expresses its hope that the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics will agree to treat the decision of such an arbitral panel on this question as binding upon both Governments and will accept this proposal as a practical means of reaching final agreement on this issue.

Accept [etc.]

DEAN ACHESON

Treaty of Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation With Colombia Signed

[Released to the press April 26]

A treaty of friendship, commerce, and navigation between the United States and Colombia was signed today in Washington. The Secretary of State signed for this Government and Ambassador Eduardo Zuleta-Angel, for Colombia.

The treaty establishes a set of advanced principles as a basis for economic and cultural relations between the two countries. It replaces, in the greater part, a 104-year old treaty with New Granada, the name by which Colombia was known until 1861. The conclusion of this treaty marks the increasingly close neighborly relations between Colombia and the United States. Other

recent evidences of close cooperation are the dispatch by Colombia of a war vessel to the Korean war zone and the assignment of a substantial contingent of troops to serve with the United Nations forces there.

The new treaty contains 26 articles and a protocol and deals in considerable detail with a wide range of subject matter. In brief, however, each of the two Governments: (1) agrees to accord within its territories to citizens and corporations of the other, treatment no less favorable than it accords to its own citizens and corporations with respect to the general run of industrial, commercial, and cultural pursuits (2) formally endorses standards regarding the protection of persons, their property and interests that reflect the most enlightened legal and constitutional principles (3) recognizes the need for special attention to requirements for stimulating investment for economic development and (4) reasserts its adherence to the principles of nondiscriminatory treatment of trade and shipping.

From the standpoint of aiding the economic interests of Colombia, the treaty represents an additional step in the development of that country's forward-looking plans for promoting its industrial development and for improving the welfare of its people by various means, including the encouragement of foreign private investment and the utilization of foreign technical assistance. Other related steps in implementing this policy have been the arrangement for an economic survey of the country, carried out in 1949 by a mission from the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development; the subsequent employment of an economic and financial advisory mission; the conclusion on March 9 of a general technical cooperation (Point 4) agreement with the United States preparatory to the negotiation of specific technical aid arrangements; and the recent extensive liberalization of the system of controls over foreign exchange designed to expand the country's trade and national income. In addition, a project for an agreement for the avoidance of double taxation is under consideration by the two Governments.

The United States program for the negotiation of treaties of this type is an integral part of this country's policy for the furtherance of liberal principles of trade and economic relations in general, and particularly for creating throughout the world conditions favorable to economic development. Domestically, these treaties reinforce in terms of international obligation the position of the Federal Government as guardian of the rights of foreigners and foreign enterprises in this country, a policy that has developed in conformity with the Constitution and Federal law. They safeguard aliens, on a basis of reciprocity, against certain statutory disabilities, particularly with respect to engaging in certain types of occupations, inheritance matters, and others.

U.S. To Send Military Supplies to China for Defense of Taiwan

[Released to the press April 25]

Exchange of Notes Between the U.S. and China

AMERICAN EMBASSY, *Taipei,*
January 30, 1951.

EXCELLENCY: Pursuant to instructions from my Government, I have the honor to deliver the following statement:

"The Government of the United States is prepared to make available to the Republic of China under the terms of P. L. 329, 81st Congress, as amended, certain military material for the defense of Taiwan against possible attack.

"This material, and any other furnished under the authority of the law referred to, is transferred on the understanding that it will be used and disposed of pursuant to the following undertakings and that failure to do so by the Chinese Government will be contrary to the understanding of the United States Government, and may be considered by the United States to be cause for the cessation of further deliveries (it being understood that the undertakings contained in the first three paragraphs below apply as well to the material transferred to the Chinese Government under that law since June 27, 1950);

"1. The Chinese Government will use the material to maintain its internal security or its legitimate self-defense.

"2. The Chinese Government will take such security measures as may be agreed in each case between the United States Government and the Chinese Government in order to prevent the disclosure and compromise of classified military articles, services or information furnished by the United States Government.

"3. The Chinese Government agrees to receive personnel of the United States Government who will discharge in the territory under the control of the Chinese Government the responsibilities of the United States Government under this agreement and who will be accorded adequate facilities to observe the progress of the assistance furnished, to confirm that the material furnished is being used for the purposes for which it is provided, and to carry out such other operations or arrangements as shall be mutually agreed pursuant to this agreement. Such personnel, including personnel temporarily assigned, will, in their relations with the Chinese Government, operate as a part of the United States Embassy, under the direction and control of the Chief of the United States Diplomatic Mission.

"4. The Chinese Government will not transfer, sell, or otherwise dispose of the material provided pursuant to the above undertakings, or any other

equipment susceptible of military use, without regard to its source, or the time or manner of its acquisition, without first obtaining the assurance of the United States Government that such equipment or material is not required by the United States for its own use or required to support programs of military assistance undertaken by the United States.

"The United States Government would appreciate a written assurance from the Chinese Government of its acceptance of the undertakings in this note."

Accept [etc.]

K. L. RANKIN
[*Charge d'Affaires, a. i.*]

TAIPEH, TAIWAN
February 9, 1951

MONSIEUR LE CHARGE D'AFFAIRES: I have the honor to acknowledge receipt of your note No. 13, dated January 30, 1951, which reads as follows:

[Here follows the text of the United States note, quoted above.]

In reply, I have the honor to signify on behalf of the Chinese Government the acceptance of the undertakings set forth in your note under reference.

Please accept [etc.]

[SEAL] GEORGE K. C. YEH
[*Minister of Foreign Affairs*]

Treaty Discussed With New Supreme Commander and Japanese Officials

Statement by Ambassador John Foster Dulles¹

[Released to the press April 24]

Our mission returns from a week in Japan.¹

One of our tasks was to inform the new Supreme Commander, General Ridgway, regarding United States policies and program for a Japanese peace settlement. This has been done. General Ridgway is quickly mastering the subject, and there can be complete confidence that he will deal effectively with the Japanese phase of

¹ The returning members of the mission in addition to Mr. Dulles are Assistant Secretary of the Army, Earl D. Johnson and Col. C. Stanton Babcock, of the Department of Defense, Robert A. Fearey, of the Department of State, secretary of the Mission, and Burnita L. O'Day, Mr. Dulles' personal secretary.

his new responsibilities. The Japanese themselves are already beginning to appreciate that, and they will soon appreciate it fully.

Another task was to reassure the Japanese nation that the change in Supreme Command did not involve change in the basic policies with which General MacArthur had been particularly identified in Japan. These policies were: an early and just Japanese peace settlement; an unwavering will to resist Communist aggression in the western Pacific, and the implementing of that will by deeds to save Japan from being left defenseless upon consummation of the treaty. We met with many Japanese political and civic leaders, and I made a public address which was widely reported to the Japanese people. In such ways, we were able to provide a large measure of reassurance; and, as our nation continues to translate these basic policies into effective action, we are confident that the Japanese nation for its part will continue to place confidence in the United States and desire close association with us.

A third task was to discuss with the Japanese Government the present status of our negotiations for a Japanese peace treaty. We had full exchanges of views with the Prime Minister and his associates. We reported the substantial progress made, the obstacles encountered, and our program for bringing the peace settlement to an early successful conclusion. In this connection, we also had useful talks with some of the diplomatic representatives in Tokyo of the Allied Powers.

There is unmistakable evidence that the Communist Parties of Russia, China, and Japan are working intensely and with renewed vigor to spread distrust and fear in Japan and to block the peace settlement on which the hopes of the Japanese people center. We return confident that their design can be frustrated if the free world acts promptly, unitedly, and with an enlightened recognition of its community of interest with the peace and freedom-seeking people of Japan.

from Bolivian private producers and the Bolivian Mining Bank. In the meantime, in order that normal shipments of Bolivian tin ores for the RFC smelter at Texas City may not be interrupted, an interim contract, covering deliveries between March 1 and May 31, 1951, has been signed, while negotiations for a long-term contract are continuing with the aim of concluding it before May 31.

At the request of the Bolivian Foreign Minister, a committee of United States officials has been formed to study, with a committee of Bolivian officials, basic Bolivian economic problems which are of mutual interest to the two Governments and which are related to the common defense effort. This committee will study the needs and possibilities of providing additional United States technical and financial assistance, public and private, in order to contribute to an increase in Bolivian production of strategic minerals and to the development of increased agricultural and industrial production.

U.S.-Bolivian Officials Named on Joint Economic Committee

[Released to the press April 27]

On April 23, the Department of State announced the formation of a committee of United States officials to study, with a committee of Bolivian officials, basic Bolivian economic problems which are of mutual interest to the two Governments and which are related to the common defense effort. The United States committee is composed of Fletcher Warren, Director of the Office of South American Affairs of the Department of State, as Chairman; Winthrop G. Brown, Acting Director of the Office of International Materials Policy of the Department of State; Merwin Bohan, who was chief of a United States economic mission which was sent to Bolivia in 1941; and Rollin S. Atwood, Deputy Director of the Office of South American Affairs.

The Bolivian committee is composed of Ricardo Martínez Vargas, Bolivian Ambassador to the United States, as Chairman; José Romero Loza, formerly Minister of Finance and National Economy in Bolivia; Juan Penaranda Minchin, Minister-Counselor of the Bolivian Embassy in Washington; and Guillermo Mariaca, General Manager of Yacimientos Petroliferos Fiscales Bolivianos, the Bolivian Government's petroleum agency.

The work of the two committees was formally initiated in a brief joint meeting at the Department of State on April 26.

U.S.-Bolivia Study Strategic Materials and Development Problems

[Released to the press April 23]

Following consultation between the Foreign Minister of Bolivia, Pedro Zilveti Arce, and the Department of State, representatives of the departments and agencies of the United States Government concerned are studying the problems involved in the subscription of long-term and mutually advantageous contracts for the purchase of strategic minerals, especially tin and tungsten,

INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND CONFERENCES

Calendar of Meetings¹

Adjourned During April 1951

GATT (General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade):			
Third Set of Tariff Negotiations of Contracting Parties	Torquay	Sept. 28-Apr. 21	
Special Session of Contracting Parties	Torquay	Mar. 29-Apr. 3	
International Exposition of Railroads, Industry and Economy	Santiago	Mar. 1-Apr. 7	
United Nations:			
Economic and Social Council:			
Social Commission	Geneva	Mar. 19-Apr. 14	
<i>Ad Hoc</i> Committee on Slavery: 2d Session	New York	Apr. 2-17	
WMO (World Meteorological Organization): First Congress	Paris	Mar. 19-Apr. 30	
ICAO (International Civil Aviation Organization):			
Airworthiness Division: 4th Session	Montreal	Mar. 20-Apr. 21	
Operations Division: 4th Session	Montreal	Mar. 27-Apr. 27	
Fourth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs of American States.	Washington	Mar. 26-Apr. 7	
Lyon International Trade Fair: 33d	Lyon	Mar. 31-Apr. 9	
First Meeting of the International Commission for the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries.	Washington	Apr. 2-10	
South Pacific Quarantine Conference	Suva, Fiji Islands	Apr. 2-11	
Cannes Film Festival	Cannes	Apr. 3-20	
IRO (International Refugee Organization):			
Executive Committee, 9th Session	Geneva	Apr. 4-19	
General Council, 7th Session	Geneva	Apr. 9-20	
FAO (Food and Agriculture Organization):			
Rice Breeders' Working Party: 2d Meeting	Bogor, Indonesia	Apr. 9-13	
Working Party on Fertilizers: 1st Meeting	Bogor, Indonesia	Apr. 14-19	
FAO/WHO Joint Expert Committee on Nutrition: 2d Session	Rome	Apr. 10-17	
XXIX International Milan Fair	Milan	Apr. 12-29	
*Health Congress of the Royal Sanitary Institute: 55th Meeting	Southport, England	Apr. 23-27	
NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization): Planning Board for Ocean Shipping: 3d Meeting	London	Apr. 23-26	
*Second Inter-American Indigenist Exposition	Rio de Janeiro	Apr. 13-30	
Rubber Study Group: 8th Session	Rome	Apr. 16-20	

In Session as of April 30, 1951

United Nations:			
General Assembly: 5th Session	Lake Success	Sept. 10-	
Economic and Social Council:			
Commission on Narcotic Drugs: 6th Session	Lake Success	Apr. 10-	
Human Rights Commission: 7th Session	Geneva	Apr. 16-	
Population Commission: 6th Session	Lake Success	Apr. 23-	
Commission on the Status of Women: 5th Session	Lake Success	Apr. 30-	
International Materials Conference	Washington	Feb. 26-	
Four Power Conference on Swiss-Allied Accord	Bern	Mar. 5-	
Council of Foreign Ministers, Meeting of Deputies	Paris	Mar. 5-Apr. —	
Intergovernmental Study Group on Germany (continuation of Fourth Phase).	London	Apr. 3-	

¹ Prepared in the Division of International Conferences, Department of State.

* Tentative.

Calendar of Meetings—Continued

In Session as of April 30, 1951—Continued

Fourth International Poplar Congress	United Kingdom	Apr. 25-
ITU (International Telecommunication Union): Administrative Council: 6th Session.	Geneva	Apr. 16-
Pan American Sanitary Organization: 13th Meeting of Executive Committee.	Washington	Apr. 23-
ICAO Air Navigation Commission Communications Division: 4th Session.	Montreal	Apr. 24-
Paris International Trade Fair	Paris	Apr. 28-
South Pacific Commission: 7th Session	Nouméa, New Caledonia	Apr. 28-
International Textile Exposition	Lille, France	Apr. 28-

Scheduled May 1-July 31, 1951

International Exposition of Textile Art and Fashion	Turin, Italy	May 2-
Festival of Britain, 1951	England	May 3-
Ninth International Exhibition of Decorative and Industrial Arts and Modern Architecture.	Milan	May 5-
WHO (World Health Organization):		
Fourth World Health Assembly	Geneva	May 7-
Executive Board: 8th Session	Geneva	June 4-
ILO (International Labor Organization):		
Coal Mines: 4th Session	Geneva	May 7-
Joint Maritime Commission	Geneva	May 21-
Governing Body: 115th Session	Geneva	May 28-
34th International Labor Conference	Geneva	June 6-
Meeting of Experts on the Status and Conditions of Employment of Domestic Workers.	Geneva	July 2-
United Nations:		
Economic and Social Council:		
Fiscal Commission: 3d Session	Lake Success	May 7-
Statistical Commission: 6th Session	Lake Success	May 7-
Economic, Employment and Development Commission	Lake Success	May 14-
Draft Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, Conference of Plenipotentiaries.	Geneva	May 28*
Economic Commission for Latin America: 4th Session	Mexico City	May 28-
Economic Commission for Europe: 6th Session	Geneva	May 29-
Subcommission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities: 4th Session.	Geneva	June 18*
Council Committee on Non-Governmental Organizations	Lake Success	June 19-
Agenda Committee	Geneva	June 26-
Council, 13th Session	Geneva	July 3-
International Law Commission: 3d Session	Geneva	May 15-
Permanent Central Opium Board and Narcotic Drugs Supervisory Body: 5th Joint Session.	Geneva	June 5*
Trusteeship Council: 9th Session	Lake Success	June 11-
Caribbean Commission: 12th Meeting	Barbados, British West Indies	May 7-
First Pan American Congress on Medical Education	Lima	May 14-
Third Regional Seminar on Social Affairs	Pôrto Alegre, Brazil	May 14-
Inter-American Commission of Women	Santiago	May 14*
First Pan American Congress on Veterinary Medicine	Lima	May 20-
Universal Postal Union:		
Executive and Liaison Committee	St. Gallen, Switzerland	May 21-
Technical Transit Committee	Pontresina, Switzerland	June 6-
Canadian International Trade Fair	Toronto	May 28-
ICAO: 5th Assembly	Montreal	June 5-
Diplomatic Conference on Maritime Law	Brussels	June 5-
ITU (International Telecommunication Union): International Radio Consultative Committee: 6th Plenary Meeting.	Geneva	June 5-
FAO Council: 12th Session	Rome	June 11-
19th International Aeronautical Exposition	Paris	June 15-
UNESCO (United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization):		
General Conference: 6th Session	Paris	June 18-
Seminar on Teaching of History	Sèvres, France	July 11-
Seminar on Teaching of Visual Arts in General Education	Bristol	July 7-
International Wheat Council, 5th Session	London	June 13-
Building Exhibition, "Constructa": the 25th	Hannover, Germany	July 3-
Conference of British Commonwealth Survey Officers	London	July 9-
14th International Congress on Public Education	Geneva	July 12-
International Commission for the Regulation of Whaling, 3d Meeting	Capetown	July 23-
Wool Study Group: 5th Meeting	London	July

*Tentative

U.S. Delegations to International Conferences

Fourth Session of Communications Division (ICAO)

The Department of State announced on April 25 that the fourth session of the Communications (Com) Division of the International Civil Aviation Organization (Icao) convened at Montreal, Canada, on April 24, 1951. The United States delegation is as follows:

Delegate and Chairman

George L. Rand, Chief, Communications Division, Civil Aeronautics Administration, Department of Commerce.

Alternate Delegate and Vice Chairman

Arthur L. Lebel, Assistant Chief, Telecommunications Policy Staff, Department of State

Advisers

John M. Beardslee, Deputy Director, Office of Federal Airways, Civil Aeronautics Administration, Department of Commerce

John Durkovic, Corporation Secretary, Aeronautical Radio, Inc., Washington, D. C.

Benjamin F. Engel, Commander, United States Coast Guard, Department of the Treasury

Thomas A. Kouchnerkavich, Electronics Engineer, International, Office of Federal Airways, Civil Aeronautics Administration, Department of Commerce

Donald Mitchell, Chief, International Affairs Branch, Aviation Division, Federal Communications Commission

Gordon C. Pearson, Aeronautical Communications Specialist, Office of Federal Airways, Civil Aeronautics Administration, Department of Commerce

Clinton A. Petry, Director, Frequency Department, Aeronautical Radio, Inc., Washington, D. C.

Edmund V. Shores, Aeronautical Communications Specialist, Office of Federal Airways, Civil Aeronautics Administration, Department of Commerce

Vernon I. Weihe, Radio Engineer, Air Transport Association of America

The Communications Division is one of ten technical Divisions of the Air Navigation Commission, as established by the Icao Council. These Divisions are responsible for formulating for the Commission and for eventual Council action recommendations on standards, procedures, and facilities which appear to be necessary or desirable for the safety, regularity or efficiency of international air navigation. In practice, the Divisions function as technical or specialized conferences open to delegations from all Icao contracting states. The

third session of the Communications Division was held at Montreal from January 11 to February 26, 1949.

The fourth session will examine problems of air communications relating, in particular, to procedures, codes, and abbreviations; frequency utilization; equipment; and communication systems. In addition, the Com Division will review its existing work program and recommendations thereon.

Fifth Session of Commission on Status of Women (ECOSOC)

The Department of State announced on April 27 that Olive Remington Goldman, United States representative on the Commission on the Status of Women of the United Nations Economic and Social Council (Ecosoc), will attend the fifth session of the Commission which will convene at Lake Success on April 30, 1951. She will be assisted by the following advisers:

Sara Buchanan, labor economist, Women's Bureau, Department of Labor

Katherine B. Flite, assistant to the legal adviser, Department of State

James N. Hyde, United States Mission to the United Nations, New York

Rachel Nason, Office of United Nations Economic and Social Affairs, Department of State

Carolyn A. Recht, Division of Research for U.S.S.R. and Eastern Europe, Department of State

Among the items on the provisional agenda for this session are political rights of women, the status of women in both public and private law, educational opportunities for women, equal pay for equal work for men and women workers, participation of women in the work of the United Nations, and the report of the Inter-American Commission of Women.

The Commission on the Status of Women, which is one of the nine permanent functional commissions of the Ecosoc, is responsible for the preparation of recommendations and reports to the Council on the promotion of women's rights in political, economic, social, educational, and civil fields. Fifteen Governments, elected by the Council, comprise the membership of this Commission. The last session of the Commission was held at Lake Success, May 8-19, 1950.

Health Congress of Royal Sanitary Institute

The Department of State announced on April 23 that the Health Congress of the Royal Sanitary Institute will convene at Southport, England, on that date. The United States delegation is as follows:

Chairman

Col. Jay F. Gamel, MC, USAF, Headquarters, Third Air Division, Middlesex, England

Delegates

Robert P. Burden, ScD., Paris Office, Rockefeller Foundation, Paris
Lt. Col. Raymond J. Karpen, MC, USA, Preventive Medicine Division, Office of the Surgeon General, Department of the Army
Lt. Col. Louis C. Kossuth, MC, USAF, chief, Preventive Medicine Division, Office of the Air Surgeon, Headquarters, United States Air Forces in Europe
Dr. Arthur S. Osborne, senior science attaché, American Embassy, London
Capt. J. P. Wood, MC, USN, Office of Naval Research, Branch Office, London

The Royal Sanitary Institute, which is the leading public health society of Great Britain, was founded in 1876 to promote the application of the English Public Health Act of 1875. The object of the Institute is to further the advancement of sanitary science in all its branches and the diffusion of knowledge relating thereto. It is the belief of the Institute that one of the best means of disseminating such knowledge is through holding annual meetings of representatives from all over the world to discuss subjects of public health and sanitation.

This meeting will afford the delegates an opportunity to exchange scientific information and to discuss, in particular, such matters as preventive medicine, maternal and child health, food and nutrition, tropical hygiene, and hygiene in industry.

The last Health Congress of the Royal Sanitary Institute was held at Eastbourne, England, April 24-28, 1950.

Pan American Sanitary Organization

The Department of State announced on April 23 that the thirteenth meeting of the executive committee of the Pan American Sanitary Organization (PASO) will convene at Washington from April 23 to May 1, 1951. The United States delegation is as follows:

Alternate United States Representative

Dr. Frederick J. Brady, Assistant Chief, International Organization Branch, Division of International Health, Public Health Service, Federal Security Agency

Advisors

James F. Anderson, Division of International Administration, Department of State
Marcia M. Fleming, Office of Assistant Legal Adviser for United Nations Affairs, Department of State
Simon N. Wilson, Office of Regional-American Affairs, Department of State

The Executive Committee was set up by a directive of the Twelfth Pan American Sanitary Conference (Caracas, January 1947), which authorized the reorganization of the Pan American Sanitary Bureau, a body established in 1902 as the central coordinating agency for public health activities in the American Republics. The Committee, elected by the Directing Council, performs interim executive and advisory functions between meetings of the Council and prepares agenda for Council meetings.

The thirteenth meeting will consider such matters as the program and budget for both the Pan American Sanitary Bureau and the regional office of the World Health Organization (WHO).

The last meeting of the Executive Committee was held at Ciudad Trujillo, Dominican Republic, October 11-13, 1950.

International Arrangements Reviewed for Equitable Use of Raw Materials

Remarks by Secretary Acheson

[Released to the press April 25]

In response to a question whether, as alleged by Aneurin Bevan, the United States was gobbling up most of the raw materials Britain also needs with resultant jeopardy to Britain's economy, Secretary Acheson today made the following remarks at his press conference, which he authorized for direct quotation.

We all know that rapid implementation of an effective defense program to meet the present situation will necessitate very real sacrifices on the part of the peoples of all 12 nations participating in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization; sacrifices in which the United States, as a member, expects to share; and of which all 12 participants are aware.

In the International Materials Conference, and in many other ways, the United States is continuing to press for increased production of essential raw materials and for international arrangements to insure an equitable and efficient utilization of existing stocks. Some of these essential materials we produce in the United States. For others, we are dependent upon foreign sources. Consumption for less essential purposes has already been restricted in this country.

The export and import policies of the United States are designed to take full account of the essential needs in other friendly countries for materials to supply their basic economy and defense programs.

Obviously, a full scale defense program suddenly imposed on the economy of any nation must have some inflationary effect; a tendency which we in the United States are equally anxious to curb.

The United States in the United Nations

[Apr. 20-May 3, 1951]

Security Council

Kashmir.—The Council met on April 30 to appoint a United Nations representative as mediator for India and Pakistan on Kashmir in accordance with the resolution adopted on March 30. His task is to effect the demilitarization of the state of Jammu and Kashmir on the basis of the two United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan (UNCIP) resolutions of August 13, 1948, and January 5, 1949, or at least to obtain the parties' agreement to a demilitarization plan.

The President, D. von Balluseck (Netherlands), stated that the delegates of the United Kingdom and the United States had presented for consideration the name of Dr. Frank P. Graham, Defense Manpower Administrator in the Department of Labor, former United States Senator, and former President of the University of North Carolina. After receiving a negative response to his inquiry whether there were any other nominees, the President asked the members to vote on the appointment of Dr. Graham as United Nations representative. The vote of approval was 7-0-4 (India, Netherlands, U.S.S.R., Yugoslavia). Dr. Graham is to report back to the Council within 3 months from the date of his arrival at the subcontinent.

Ambassador Warren R. Austin, in presenting the name of Dr. Graham, stated that he was "among the five distinguished United States citizens designated by my Government for inclusion in the United Nations Panel for Inquiry and Conciliation. His fine qualities are well appreciated in the United States where he is known as a distinguished educator, statesman, government official, and negotiator of great ability. I know that he will bring to this new task in full measure the qualities needed for his part to accomplish his mission. . . . It is our earnest hope that both parties will work with Dr. Graham and will implement the details of demilitarization preparatory to the plebiscite, which will permit the people of Kashmir freely to express their will regarding the question of accession."

Palestine.—Two meetings were held, April 25 and May 2, on the Palestine question. On April 25 statements were made by Ambassador Abba S. Eban (Israel) and by Maj. Gen. William E. Riley, USMC, Chief of Staff of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization in Palestine.

Mr. Eban stated that: (1) The original center of tension in the demilitarized zone between Syria and Israel had been the Huleh area, where Syria had "fomented" incidents in February and March

in order to "impede" the drainage of the swamps.

(2) During negotiations for an armistice, Dr. Bunche had proposed the creation of a demilitarized zone, including the two areas, Huleh and Ain Gev, and some others. Israel had been assured that only its military forces would be denied access to the zone, that it could continue to pursue all non-military activities. The text of the armistice agreement contained no such restrictions as were now being claimed, and he could state "from intimate personal knowledge" that Israel would never have signed an agreement containing any such restrictions. The view of Israel was that the Chief of Staff of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization and the Chairman of the Israeli-Syrian Mixed Armistice Commission had no capacity to make rulings on sovereignty, on the annulment or extension of concessions, on laws of expropriation, or other legal and political matters. (3) The areas in question had been part of Israel since its establishment. Work on the Huleh concession had extended to the demilitarized zone in January with the full knowledge of the Syrian Government and the representatives of the United Nations—and "without objection." (4) Syria had proclaimed its intention to annex the Huleh and the Ain Gev areas. "We reject Syria's claim and will sign no peace involving cession of these areas." (5) Israel considered that the retaliatory bombing of El Hamma and nearby Syrian positions on April 4 had been taken in self-defense following the Syrian wanton murder of seven Israeli policemen. He admitted that the action "may not be in conformity with the armistice agreement" and wanted to voice Israel's regret. It had been due "only to extreme provocation."

General Riley commenced his discussion of this dispute by expressing regret that the complaints had come before the Council since he believed that they could and should be handled by the Syrian-Israeli Mixed Armistice Commission. He set forth Dr. Bunche's interpretation of Syria's and Israel's rights in the demilitarized zone between them. He pointed out that this interpretation had been accepted by both countries and accordingly had governed him. General Riley, in his enforcement of the armistice agreement's provisions relating to the zone. Neither party could validly claim to have a free hand in the demilitarized zone over civilian activity, while military activity was totally excluded. Dr. Bunche had stressed that the armistice agreement did not prejudge the question of territorial sovereignty. General Riley stated that the "troublesome question" of administrative authority in the zone was one which, if

considered and clarified by the Security Council, could be very useful to the Mixed Armistice Commission. The Commission could then take decisions on all the subsidiary questions involved.

In answer to a series of questions put to him at the May 2 meeting by the delegates of Ecuador, Israel, Syria, United Kingdom, and the United States, he replied: (1) The removal of armed forces was basic to the security of the demilitarized zone and entry of forces from either side would be a flagrant violation of the armistice agreement; (2) The Huleh project itself should not be discussed by the Mixed Armistice Commission. However, it could be considered if Syria complained regarding the expropriation of land as this would be a dispute over the interpretation of the agreement. He was not aware that any of the actual drainage work had been undertaken as the result of approval by the MAC Chairman. The Arabs had been dispossessed of 7 acres in the area and thus the project was interfering with the restoration of normal activities; (3) Each village was responsible only to itself for its administration and policing, and, in the event of disputes, the MAC Chairman would work through the heads of the Arab and Israeli villages. (4) The issue was whether Syria could dictate to Israel as to what the latter could do in Israeli-controlled territory, including Huleh. If the Israelis could proceed with the project without violating the armistice or interfering with the restoration of normal life, then Syria could not say that Israel could not carry it out.

Economic and Social Council

Commission on the Status of Women.—The 15-member Commission opened its fifth session at Lake Success on April 30. Mrs. Marie-Helen Lefaucheux (France) was reelected chairman. Mrs. Olive R. Goldman, chief, Public Education Division of Vocational Rehabilitation, Illinois State Board of Vocational Education, is the United States delegate.

The Commission's task is to make recommendations and reports to the Economic and Social Council on the promotion of women's rights in the political, civil, economic, social, and educational fields, which would implement the principle of equality of rights for men and women.

The adopted agenda includes: report of the Secretary-General relating to the political rights of women; consideration of a draft convention on the political rights of women; political education for women in countries where women have only recently acquired the right to vote; status of women in public law; report of the Inter-American Commission of Women; equal pay for equal work for men and women; and participation of women in the work of the United Nations.

The Commission decided that it was not competent to consider the U.S.S.R. motion to unseat the representative of the Chinese Nationalist Govern-

ment. It also voted not to include in the agenda a new item sponsored by the U.S.S.R. and Poland in behalf of the Women's International Democratic Federation (WIDF) resolution similar to the Communist Stockholm "Partisans of Peace" petition. The chairman stated that the Commission should stay strictly within the terms of its reference, and in this way it could best serve not only the cause of women but also of peace.

Population Commission.—The 12-member Commission began its sixth session at Lake Success on April 23. Alfred Sauvy (France) was re-elected chairman, Germano Jardim (Brazil) vice chairman, and Philip M. Hauser (U. S.) rapporteur.

Among the agenda items are: studies of inter-relationships of demographic, economic, and social factors in particular areas; demographic aspects of migration; mortality and mortality rates; a revision of the report on "Findings of studies on the inter-relationships between population trends and economic and social factors"; problems connected with the 1950 and 1951 censuses of population; demographic aspects of the problem of retired persons and the aged; regional seminars on population problems; and convening of a World Population Conference under United Nations auspices.

The U.S.S.R.'s customary proposal, that the representative of the People's Republic of China should be invited to attend in place of the representative of the Chinese Nationalist Government, was ruled out of order by the Chairman. This decision was upheld 7-2 (U.S.S.R., Ukraine)-1 (Yugoslavia). The Commission will submit a report to the Economic and Social Council at the close of the session.

Specialized Agencies

World Meteorological Organization (WMO).—The First Congress of the WMO concluded a 6-week session in Paris on April 28, after approving an agreement which provides for its affiliation with the United Nations as a specialized agency. The agreement will be submitted to the Economic and Social Council (Ecosoc) and the General Assembly for final approval.

As of February 15, 1951, 44 states, including the United States, had deposited instruments of ratification or accession to the Convention establishing the Organization.

Dr. F. W. Reichelderfer, Chief of the United States Weather Bureau, was elected President. An Executive Committee was established, which will meet at least once a year, and will guide the activities of WMO between sessions of the Congress, whose headquarters will be at Geneva.

The basic objective of the Organization is to coordinate, standardize, and improve world meteorological activities, and to encourage an efficient exchange of meteorological information between countries.

Eighteenth Report of U.N. Command Operations in Korea

FOR THE PERIOD MARCH 16-31, 1951¹

U.N. doc. 8/2107
Dated Apr. 26, 1951

I herewith submit report number 18 of the United Nations Command Operations in Korea for the period 16-31 March, inclusive. United Nations Command communiqués number 824-839 provide detailed accounts of these operations.

During this period the enemy has been driven northward about fifteen miles over the entire front, except in the Seoul area, where United Nations forces advanced 25 miles. The heaviest fighting occurred from 23 to 25 March near Uijongbu, Naegang, and Hyon, on the western front, and at Chaun-Ni on the central front. Enemy resistance appeared to be stiffening toward the end of the period, especially along the central front in the Kapyong and Chunchon area. In his withdrawal the enemy has made increasing use of mortars and landmines.

Front lines at the close of the period ran generally from Munsan east through Chunchon to the vicinity of Hyon-Ni, and thence northeast to Yangyang, which fell to United Nations forces on 27 March.

During the past two weeks the battered Chinese units on the central front were relieved and replaced by at least three, and probably four, rehabilitated Chinese Communist armies. Concurrently, the enemy has built a powerful reserve force, generally within supporting distance of the front. This force, includes four fresh north

Korean corps, totaling twelve divisions, the equivalent of five fresh Chinese Communist force armies, totaling approximately fifteen divisions, and the four Chinese Communist force armies, totaling twelve divisions, which were recently withdrawn from combat. Enemy forces currently deployed on the front, plus the reserve forces, total about sixty divisions. Southbound transport movements in the enemy rear indicate a strong effort to provide adequate logistical support for future combat operations. Enemy traffic is heaviest on north-south supply routes terminating in Central Korea near the 38th parallel.

Enemy guerrilla forces in United Nations rear areas have been steadily reduced by vigorous United Nations action. Most contacts occurred in the east coastal area, as United Nations forces sought out and attacked scattered guerrilla bands. Guerrilla strength has been somewhat reduced in southwestern Korea by the surrender of numerous guerrillas to civil authorities.

Constant patrol and daily reconnaissance operations by United Nations Naval forces continued to deny movement of enemy shipping in Korean waters. Naval gunfire support continued along the east coast near the 38th parallel. Coordinated interdiction operations by United Nations carrier-based aircraft and surface forces, conducted on a round-the-clock basis, continued to restrict severely the movement of enemy supplies on the northeast Korean lines of communication. One specially planned bombardment operation in the Wonsan area inflicted very severe personnel casualties on a large concentration of enemy troops.

More than the usual numbers of drifting mines were sighted in Korean waters during the period of this report. Check minesweeping operations continued, mainly for the protection of ships engaged in shore bombardment.

United Nations air power continued the relentless pounding of enemy troops, supplies and transportation facilities. The Far East Air Forces with attached South African, Australian and shore-based United States Marine units consistently averaged more than 1,000 sorties a day. On 23 March the Fifth Air Force mounted its one

¹ Transmitted to the Security Council by Ambassador Warren R. Austin, U.S. representative in the Security Council, on April 26. For texts of the first, second, third, fourth, fifth, sixth, seventh, eighth, ninth, tenth, and eleventh reports to the Security Council on U.N. command operation in Korea, see BULLETIN, of Aug. 7, 1950, p. 203; Aug. 28, 1950, p. 323; and Sept. 11, 1950, p. 403; Oct. 2, 1950, p. 534; Oct. 16, 1950, p. 603; Nov. 6, 1950, p. 729; Nov. 13, 1950, p. 759; Jan. 8, 1951, p. 43, and Feb. 19, 1951, p. 304, respectively. The reports which have been published separately as Department of State publications 3935, 3962, 3978, 3986, 4006, 4015, and 4108 respectively will appear hereafter only in the BULLETIN. The twelfth, thirteenth, fourteenth reports appear in the BULLETIN of Mar. 19, 1951, p. 470; the fifteenth and sixteenth reports in the BULLETIN of Apr. 16, 1951, p. 625; and the seventeenth report in the BULLETIN of Apr. 30, 1951, p. 710.

hundred thousandth sortie of the air war in Korea.

As battle lines continued to move northward, rail and highway bridges, tunnels, trackage, locomotives and boxcars were destroyed in a massive air effort which has substantially reduced the enemy's ability to furnish the regrouping forces with ammunition and reinforcements. Virtually all enemy supply movement during daylight hours has been brought to a standstill, while improved methods of air operations at night have facilitated the destruction of a large portion of his rail and vehicular traffic attempting to move under cover of darkness.

Several enemy MIG-type planes were destroyed and others damaged; however, most of the flights which have been observed south of the Yalu River have fled to their Manchurian sanctuary when approached by United Nations aircraft.

The second and largest airborne operation of the Korean war was launched on 23 March. After days of careful preparation, thousands of paratroopers were successfully dropped behind enemy lines about fifteen miles northwest of Seoul. In addition to normal unit equipment and supplies, the drop included heavy equipment, jeeps, weapon carriers, howitzers, and many other bulky items. Earlier in the day, all possible enemy troop positions were blasted with napalm, rockets and bombs by fighters and bombers of the Far East Air Forces.

Enemy prisoners report continuing strenuous efforts by Communist officers to isolate their men from the truth and to deceive them with calculated falsifications. These tactics are being combated with increasing effectiveness by United Nations leaflets and loudspeaker and radio broadcasts. Through these media, many Chinese and North Korean soldiers are, even now, learning for the first time that their armies are opposing the United Nations as well as the Republic of Korea. They are also being shown, by actual photographs as well as by descriptions, how the United Nations forces accord to every enemy prisoner the privileges guaranteed him by the Geneva Convention. Prisoners report, almost without exception, that Communist officers have attempted to convince them that they will be executed or tortured if captured. Approximately 300 million United Nations leaflets have now been disseminated in Korea, in conjunction with regular broadcasts from ground and airborne loudspeakers and from fixed radio stations.

Violations of the laws of war by the enemy continue to be reported by United Nations forces in Korea. The following incidents in which the armed forces of North Korea have violated, and are continuing to violate, accepted standards for the humanitarian conduct of war have been reported: On or about 22 September 1950 the 27 Regimental Commander (NKPA) ordered the execution of six United Nations prisoners of war. Their hands were bound, eyes covered and they

were shot to death near Kachon-Myon. One mile southwest of Inchon the bodies of twenty-seven civilians were found who had been bound and shot on or about 15 January 1951. On 8 February 1951, in the village of Pabalmak, the bodies of nine civilians were uncovered. Available information indicated the victims had been bound and shot on or about 5 February 1951. These reports are being collated and investigated to verify the facts and to establish the units and persons responsible.

THE CONGRESS

Legislation

- Authorizing Vessels of Canadian Registry To Transport Iron Ore Between United States Ports on the Great Lakes During 1951. H. Rept. 283, 82d Cong. 1st sess. [To accompany H. R. 2338] 4 pp.
- Copper Import-Tax Suspension. H. Rept. 285, 82d Cong. 1st sess. [To accompany H. R. 3336] 3 pp.
- Granting of Permanent Residence to Certain Aliens. H. Rept. 303, 82d Cong. 1st sess. [To accompany H. Con. Res. 90] 2 pp.
- Amending the Displaced Persons Act of 1948, as Amended. H. Rept. 325, 82d Cong. 1st sess. [To accompany H. R. 3576] 6 pp.
- Importation of Foreign Agricultural Workers. H. Rept. 326, 82d Cong. 1st sess. [To accompany H. R. 3283] 13 pp.
- Report of Activities of the National Advisory Council on International Monetary and Financial Problems. Message from the President of the United States transmitting a report . . . H. Doc. 70, 82d Cong. 1st sess. 69 pp.
- Granting of Permanent Residence to Certain Aliens. S. Rept. 188, 82d Cong. 1st sess. [To accompany H. Con. Res. 49] 2 pp.
- Amending Section 6 of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949. S. Rept. 195, 82d Cong. 1st sess. [To accompany S. 927] 2 pp.
- Importation of Foreign Agricultural Workers. S. Rept. 214, 82d Cong. 1st sess. [To accompany S. 984] 11 pp.
- Giving the Department of Commerce the Authority To Extend Certain Charters of Vessels to Citizens of the Republic of the Philippines. S. Rept. 218, 82d Cong. 1st sess. [To accompany S. J. Res. 57] 5 pp.
- Joint Economic Report. A Report of the Joint Committee on the Economic Report on the January 1951 Economic Report of the President. S. Rept. 210, 82d Cong. 1st sess. 121 pp.
- Convention With Canada Relating to Operation of Certain Radio Equipment or Stations. Message from the President of the United States transmitting a Convention . . . signed at Ottawa on February 8, 1951. Senate Ex. C. 82d Cong. 1st sess. 5 pp.
- January 1951 Economic Report of the President. Hearings before the Joint Committee of the United States, Eighty-second Congress, first session, on Sec. 5 (A) of Public Law 304 (79th Congress) January 22, 24, 25, 26, 29, 31, February 2, 1951. 530 pp.
- Proposed Supplemental Appropriation To Pay Claims for Damages, Audited Claims, and Judgments Rendered Against the United States. Communication from the President of the United States . . . in the amount of \$1,999,044.26 . . . H. Doc. 85, 82d Cong. 1st sess. 20 pp.

Summary of Report on Mutual Defense Assistance Program

SEMIANNUAL REPORT SUBMITTED TO CONGRESS

[Released to the press April 26]

President Truman, on April 25, transmitted to the Congress the second semiannual report on the Mutual Defense Assistance Program (MDAP), covering the period from April 6 to October 6, 1950.

(This completes the first full year of operation under Public Law 329, 81st Cong., 1st sess., cited as the "Mutual Defense Assistance Act of 1949," approved October 6, 1949. The act was amended to increase its scope at the 2d sess. [Public Law 621, 81st Cong.] approved July 26, 1950.)

Summary of Report

The report details the joint activities of the Department of State, the Department of Defense, and the Economic Cooperation Administration in providing military assistance to "certain friendly nations whose security must be maintained in the interests of preserving world peace"—including North Atlantic Treaty nations.

While most of the details of the program—the world's greatest peacetime cooperative defense effort—have already been made public, the report shows them in relation to their bearing on American foreign policy today and makes clear that the program of economic-military aid being followed is aimed at preserving world peace.

As the report states:

Because communism probed for weak links regardless of their character and then skillfully selected and shaped its tactics to exploit them, the task of building strength in the free world was that of building strength in all of its principal elements—economic, political, spiritual, and military. It was futile to revive the economy and spirit of a people in order to provide a shield against internal Communist aggression while leaving them an easy, undefended target for Soviet military or paramilitary forces.

Moreover, the attainment of internal stability depended in part upon the development of a feeling of security from external aggression—a conviction that the fruits of the self-discipline and hard labor required for economic recovery could not be harvested by a conqueror. Conversely, however, no nation could create and maintain an effective military establishment without a healthy economy. Similarly, the cost of such an establishment would be unjustified if it protected a nation which was too weak

internally to survive Communist subversion or was lacking in the will to resist external force in crisis. The development of economic, military, political, and spiritual strength must go hand-in-hand, and for this reason the principal elements of the American program to achieve peace and security were specifically designed to provide these several components of total strength both abroad and at home.

The principal elements of this program were:

(1) The European Recovery Program and other economic programs designed to assist the free nations to repair the ravages of war and to attain a standard of existence that gave them the strength and the desire to resist Communist subversion and propaganda;

(2) the creation and maintenance of an American defensive military establishment capable, alone in the first instance, and later as part of a collective force, of discouraging any immediate challenge of military aggression;

(3) participation in collective security arrangements with other friendly Governments in the Western Hemisphere and North Atlantic area in those cases where, in the light of our available resources, the character of our strategic interests, and the practicability of effective associations, such arrangements were likely to provide increased military strength against aggression; and

(4) the Mutual Defense Assistance Program, and several smaller and more specific earlier programs, intended to provide cooperating free nations, to the extent that they could not help themselves, with the physical means of achieving military strength.

Along with strong and continuous support for the United Nations in both word and action, the United States has vigorously and with increasing success pursued these four courses.

Whereas, the first 6 months of operation of the Mutual Defense Assistance Program had represented a period of planning and preparation, the second 6 months—to October 6, 1950—was a period of active operations. By the end of the period, approximately 330,000 measurement tons of military matériel and commodities had been shipped, including nearly 500 tanks and combat vehicles.

A sharp upswing in the obligation of MDAP funds also is noted in the report. From March 31, 1950, when total obligations were just under 42 million dollars (less than 3 percent of total funds appropriated for fiscal year 1950), obligations jumped to about 1.9 billion dollars by October first.

The extent to which cooperating nations are making efforts of their own to build their defenses is discussed at length in the report.

In summing up, the conclusion of the report states:

The story of the Mutual Defense Assistance Program which has been recorded in these pages bespeaks its own lessons. The world as we find it is a world in which the ability of free men to preserve their freedom depends upon the ability and will of free men to defend themselves against the sinister, virulent, and powerful forces which seek to enslave them. Everywhere, Soviet communism, evil and strong, is assaulting the ramparts of liberty—probing for weakness and endeavoring by the exploitation of weakness to spread the hopeless darkness which covers its present, already vast empire to the farthest reaches of the earth. The events which have been chronicled in this report have demonstrated the nature and ever-present character of this danger. They have also proved that this danger can only be removed by building comparable strength throughout the free world—spiritual strength, political strength, economic strength, and military strength. Force must be confronted with force—force defensively so great that Soviet communism will never dare to test it. Toward this end the Mutual Defense Assistance Program clearly has an indispensable role. It must therefore be continued in the future for so long and in such size and form as may be required to build the kind of military strength among free nations that will preserve the security of these nations, including the United States, against Soviet aggression.

The task of meeting Soviet communism on its own terms in every sphere is a manageable task, but it requires more than plans, promises, and hopes. It will demand the best and most that every free nation can contribute. The price will be high, but it is a price which the free nations can pay, and it is a price that they must pay if they wish to preserve their freedom.

The Mutual Defense Assistance Program and other programs directed toward strengthening the non-Soviet world are a necessary part of that price. There is no other choice, no easy middle road of concession or neutrality, because Soviet communism brooks no compromise except where compromise will serve its own imperialistic ends. So long as this condition persists, free man will either meet the challenge and pay the price or cease to be free. Whether they will have the foresight and wisdom to look beyond the shadows of their own hamlets and perceive and understand this fact, and whether they will have the courage and be prepared to make the heavy sacrifices required to deal therewith, are the great issues of our time. American foreign policy proceeds on the assumption that the quality of free men and nations is such that these issues can and must be resolved on the side of freedom and liberty.

PRESIDENT'S MESSAGE TO CONGRESS

[Released to the press by the White House April 26]

To the Congress of the United States:

Pursuant to the provisions of Public Law 329 (81st Cong., 1st sess., 63 Stat. 714), I submit the Second Semiannual Report on the Mutual Defense Assistance Program, covering the period from April 6, 1950 to October 6, 1950.

In making this submission I can do no better than to reiterate the following words which were contained in my letter submitting the First Semiannual Report on June 1, 1950:

By its enactment of the Mutual Defense Assistance Act of 1949, and by its earlier provision of aid for Greece and Turkey, the Congress of the United States recognized

that the security of the United States required a strengthening of the will and ability of certain free nations to resist the aggression with which they were threatened. The preservation of world peace in a form which free peoples could accept depended then, as it depends now, upon the physical capacity and moral determination of the free world to stem those forces which seek to cloak the whole earth with the mantle of totalitarianism. The Mutual Defense Assistance Program represents one part of our effort to assist in the development of this essential capacity and determination and, as the attached report clearly demonstrates, is, and must continue to be, an integral part of the total policy of the United States.

Events since that time have proved beyond a reasonable doubt the truth of these principles.

HARRY S. TRUMAN

THE WHITE HOUSE
April 25, 1951.

THE DEPARTMENT

Mrs. Bertha S. Rodrick Retires With Fifty-Year Employment Record

Mrs. Bertha S. Rodrick retired from the Department of State on April 30, 1951 after 50 years of service.¹ She is the first woman employee to achieve this record of service in the history of the Department.

Mrs. Rodrick was first appointed to the Department on March 28, 1900. At this time, she was employed for 1 month to do special work on the Foreign Relations volumes. On May 16, 1901, she was appointed to the Department as a stenographer in the Bureau of Indexes and Archives, and her service has been consecutive since that time.

In 1906, she was transferred to the Passport Division, which at that time consisted of 7 employees. At present, there are over 200 employees in this Division, headed by Ruth B. Shipley, more than the total employment of the Department in 1906. Since that time, the Passport Division has issued 5 1/4 million passports.

Mrs. Rodrick's knowledge of passport requirements and procedures and long experience with all phases of this critical facet of the Department's responsibilities has made her services effective in dealing with the wide range of requests and inquiries relative to passports and complicated citizenship matters.

Secretary of State Acheson presented a letter of commendation for her noteworthy service to Mrs. Rodrick on April 30, 1951.

¹ For interview with Mrs. Rodrick, *Viewing 48 Years in the Department of State*, see BULLETIN of Nov. 14, 1949, p. 741.

PUBLICATIONS

Pamphlets on Germany and German Youth Released

[Released to the press April 29]

The Department of State released today two pamphlets relating to Germany and German youth. They are *Confuse and Control: Soviet Techniques in Germany*, and *Preparation for Tomorrow: A German Boy's Year in America*.

The pamphlet *Confuse and Control*, describes Soviet efforts to reduce the German people to a helpless confusion of distrust and divided purpose. Through example and detailed analysis, presented against the background of United States policies and programs in Germany, these hundred-odd pages give the story of Soviet subversion tactics, their successes, and their failures in a crucial year of the occupation. The account opens with an estimate of Soviet intentions and of the importance of Germany to the U.S.S.R. and to the free world. It proceeds with a discussion of the two Germanys of today, an estimate of the influence of communism in Western Germany, and an examination of the current Party line, including the Kremlin version of the Korean issue as spread by the Communist "free" press in Eastern Germany. Communist literature, Communist-inspired riots, and the remarkable election of October 1950 are brought into the record.

Also brought into the record are the attempts of the Soviets to entice the young people of Eastern Germany into the Communist Party by the methods Hitler used more than a decade ago to convert the youth of his day to nazism. The pamphlet describes the Communist spring festival in Berlin a year ago when half a million young Germans were brought to the capital for a jamboree that was to rise to a climax in a riotous march through Western Berlin. Through the good sense and the precautions taken by the citizens and officials of Western Berlin, the Soviet plans for a bloody riot—and the world headlines that would have announced it—were blocked. Instead, some thousands of the young visitors who wandered into Western Berlin were welcomed by the people of that sector who took them into their homes and offset some of their Communist teachings with considerable success.

Confuse and Control pays tribute to the citizens of both Eastern and Western Berlin for the courageous way in which they are resisting Soviet pressures. With a spirit characteristic of most of the peoples who stand closely under the guns of

the Kremlin, Berliners are showing a fortitude and toughness of mind that are defeating the Soviet confusion tactics. As this account indicates, Germans who are not in daily contact with Soviet rule are likely to be more susceptible to these confusion tactics, but the strenuous efforts of the Allied occupation authorities in Western Germany have had a marked success in defeating Soviet plans and in building up the democratic patterns that are establishing confidence and a clear goal for the German people.

Confuse and Control gives a full pictorial coverage of its topics with maps, cartoons, and photographs. Included are reproductions of Communist posters extolling the "joys" of living under communism and deplored, with pointed reference to Germany's problems, the horrors of American "brutality" and "dollar imperialism."

The second pamphlet, *Preparation for Tomorrow*, the Department of State has told the story of a 17-year-old German boy's year in America under the Department's exchange program for German boys and girls of secondary school age. This illustrated pamphlet describes Ernst Taucher's family background, how the opportunity to go to the United States came to him, his journey, his introduction to American life in an Indiana farming community, his experiences as a member of a hospitable midwestern family, as a student in the high school, and as a sharer in the everyday life of a small town. Finally, it describes the conflicting emotions with which Ernst uproots himself from his new life and returns to Germany.

Ernst's experiences, special and extraordinary as they seemed to him, are common to the 576 German youngsters who have had or are now having a chance to learn what democracy is by living with it for a year under American conditions.

The exchange program for Germany's teen-age boys and girls, as conducted by the State Department's Office of Educational Exchange with the cooperation of various religious and civic organizations, is designed to give some of Germany's most promising young people practical training in democratic procedures and living. Ernst speaks of his American experience as "the most wonderful year of my life." The Department and the increasing number of Americans who have come to know the young visitors from Germany take the position that the teen-ager exchange program is a sensible and typically American way of helping Germany to develop sound leadership.

Both of these publications are on sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington 25, D. C. The price of *Confuse and Control: Soviet Techniques in Germany* is 30¢. The pamphlet, *Preparation for Tomorrow: A German Boy's Year in America*, sells for 25¢.

	Page	Page
American Republics		
BOLIVIA:		
Joint Economic Committee Officials Named	748	
Joint Study of Materials and Development	748	
COLOMBIA: Treaty of Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation Signed With U.S.	746	
Pan American Sanitary Organization Meeting	752	
Asia		
CHINA: U.S. To Send Military Supplies for Taiwan. Exchange of Notes (Rankin, Yeh)	747	
JAPAN: Peace Treaty:		
Discussion With New Supreme Commander and Japanese Officials (Dulles)	747	
Peace Without Fear. (Dulles before U.N. Assn. of Japan)	726	
KOREA: U.N. Command Operations, 18th Report. (Mar. 16-31, 1951)	755	
Aviation		
ICAO Communications Division, 4th session	751	
Claims and Property		
Claims-Filing Procedure Under Berlin Law	743	
Communism		
Confuse and Control: Soviet Techniques in Germany (Pamphlet) Released	759	
Japan Treaty Discussions With Supreme Commander and Japanese Officials (Dulles)	747	
MDAP Semannual Report: Message to Congress, Text (Truman); Summary	757	
Outlook and Tasks Ahead for Germany: U.S. Policies. (McCloy over Bavarian Radio)	736	
Peace Without Fear (Dulles before U.N. Assn. of Japan)	726	
Soviet Techniques for "Peace" (Hickerson before Foreign Policy Institute, Milwaukee)	731	
Congress		
MDAP Semannual Report: Message of Transmission, Text (Truman); Summary	757	
Legislation Listed	756	
Europe		
GERMANY:		
Claims-Filing Procedure Under Berlin Law	743	
ECA Purchase of Raw Cotton	743	
Monthly Economic Review (Feb. 1951)	738	
Outlook and Tasks Ahead-U.S. Policies (McCloy over Bavarian Radio)	736	
Pamphlets on Germany and Youth Released	759	
HUNGARY: Robert A. Vogeler Release: Background of Negotiations; U.S. Assurances	723	
U.K.:		
Health Congress Meeting, Royal Sanitary Institute	752	
International Arrangements for Raw Materials Reviewed (Acheson)	752	
U.S.S.R.:		
Japan Peace Treaty, Soviet Action (Dulles before U.N. Assn. of Japan)	726	
U.S. Proposes To Submit Lend-Lease Settlement to Arbitral Panel	744	
Finance		
German Monthly Economic Review (Feb. 1951)	738	
Foreign Service		
Robert A. Vogeler Released by Hungary Govt.: Negotiations; U.S. Assurances	723	
Health		
Health Congress Meets, Royal Sanitary Institute	752	
Pan American Sanitary Organization Meeting	752	
Human Rights		
Commission on Status of Women (ECOSOC)	751	
Industry		
ECA Purchase of Raw Cotton for West Germany	743	
German Monthly Economic Review (Feb. 1951)	738	
Information and Educational Exchange Program		
Pamphlets on Germany and Youth Released	759	
International Meetings		
Calendar of Meetings		749
U.S. Delegations:		
Commission on Status of Women (ECOSOC)	751	
Health Congress, Royal Sanitary Institute	752	
ICAO Communications Division	751	
Pan American Sanitary Organization	752	
Labor		
German Monthly Economic Review (Feb. 1951)	738	
Mutual Aid and Defense		
MDAP: Semiannual Report: Message to Congress, Text (Truman); Summary	757	
Outlook and Tasks Ahead for Germany: U.S. Policies (McCloy over Bavarian Radio)	736	
Pacific Ocean Area, U.S. Negotiations (Dulles before U.N. Assn. of Japan)	726	
U.S.-Bolivian Officials Named on Joint Economic Committee	748	
U.S.-Bolivia Study Materials and Development	748	
U.S. To Send Military Supplies for Taiwan Defense Exchange of Notes. (Rankin, Yeh)	747	
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)		
International Agreements for Raw Materials Reviewed (Acheson)		752
Presidential Documents		
MESSAGES TO CONGRESS: MDAP Report		757
Protection of U.S. Nationals and Property		
Robert A. Vogeler Released by Hungary Govt.: Negotiations; U.S. Assurances		723
Publications		
Pamphlets on Germany and Youth Released		759
State, Department of		
Retirement: Bertha S. Rodrick		758
Strategic Materials		
International Arrangements Reviewed (Acheson)		752
U.S.-Bolivia Study Joint Problems		748
Trade		
German Monthly Economic Review (Feb. 1951)		738
Transportation		
German Monthly Economic Review (Feb. 1951)		738
Treaties and Other International Agreements		
COLOMBIA: Treaty of Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation, Signature		746
HUNGARY: Peace Treaty (1947) U.S. Assurances (Art. 30) in Release of Vogeler		723
JAPAN Peace Treaty: U.S. Action Summarized (Dulles before U.N. Assn. of Japan)		726
LEND-LEASE (1942): Proposal To Submit Settlement With U.S.S.R. to Arbitral Panel		744
United Nations		
Soviet Techniques for "Peace" (Hickerson before Foreign Policy Institute, Milwaukee)		731
U.N. Command Operations in Korea, 18th Report (Mar. 16-31, 1951)		755
U.S. in U.N. (Weekly Summary)		753
	<i>Name Index</i>	
Acheson, Secretary Dean		746, 752
Austin, Warren R.		755
Brady, Dr. Frederick J.		752
Dulles, John Foster		726, 747
Gamel, Col. Jay F.		752
Goldman, Olive Remington		751
Hickerson, John D.		731
McCloy, John J.		736
Rand, George L.		751
Ranklin, K. L.		747
Rodrick, Bertha S.		758
Truman, Harry S.		757, 758
Vargas, Ricardo Martinez		748
Vogeler, Robert A.		723
Warren, Fletcher		748
Yeh, George K. C.		747
Zilvetti, Pedro Arce		748
Zuleta, Eduardo Angel		746